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Abstract
Starting with a thorough discussion of the conceptual embedding in existing schools of thought and liter-
ature we develop a framework that aims to be empirically adequate yet scalable to epistemic states where an
agent might testify to uncertainly believe a propositional formula based on the acceptance that a propositional
formula is possible, called accepted truth. The familiarity of human agents with probability assignments make
probabilism particularly appealing as quantitative modelling framework for defeasible reasoning that aspires
empirical adequacy for gradual belief expressed as credence functions. We employ the inner measure induced
by the probability measure, going back to Halmos, interpreted as estimate for uncertainty. Doing so omits
generally requiring direct probability assignments testiﬁed as strength of belief and uncertainty by a human
agent. We provide a logical setting of the two concepts uncertain belief and accepted truth, completely relying
on the the formal frameworks of 'Reasoning about Probabilities' developed by Fagin, Halpern and Megiddo and
the 'Metaepistemic logic MEL' developed by Banerjee and Dubois. The purport of Probabilistic Uncertainty is
a framework allowing with a single quantitative concept (an inner measure induced by a probability measure)
expressing two epistemological concepts: possibilities as belief simpliciter called accepted truth, and the agents'
credence called uncertain belief for a criterion of evaluation, called rationality. The propositions accepted to be
possible form the meta-epistemic context(s) in which the agent can reason and testify uncertain belief or suspend
judgement.
This work is part of the larger project INTEGRITY. Integrity develops a conceptual frame integrating beliefs
with individual (and consensual group) decision making and action based on belief awareness. Comments and
criticisms are most welcome via email.
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1 Introduction
When discussing the role of context for human reasoning, we ﬁrst emphasize that the vast scope of the subject is
restricted in this paper to speciﬁc perspectives on reasoning and context. We take human reasoning to be a process
involving limited and subjectively individual intellectual, physical, mental, and emotional components. Hence, in
our understanding a long-standing and well-known conﬂict between reasoning as logical (AI treatable) process and
reasoning as a human (holistically treatable) process is present, formulated by Harman (1986, p. 107),
There is a tendency to identify reasoning with proof or argument in accordance with rules of logic.
[. . . ] But the identiﬁcation is mistaken. Reasoning is not argument or proof. It is a procedure of revising
one's beliefs, for changing one's view. (Reasoning also eﬀects one's plans, intentions, desires, hopes, and
so forth).
When a holistic understanding of reasoning is adopted, as in our discussion, modelling reasoning processes comes
down to modelling beliefs and belief changes.
The perspective on context we feel to be most appropriate given the understanding of reasoning is equally holistic
and concerns physical and non-physical inﬂuences a human reasoner is confronted with. That is, the context within
which a reasoner holds, evaluates, and changes beliefs is vested in both physical presence and conceptual stocks.
The physical presence concerns the in sito reasoning conditions (e.g. hearing music, being in sunshine, smelling
tasty food, cf. Liu et al. (2009)) of the human. In Anderson (2006) Anderson successfully argues that human
beings have many discriminable pathways between the world and an agent's beliefs, he calls such a pathway
openness, and that each epistemically relevant mode of openness to the world (in particular physical intervention)
operates according to its own logic and for its own purpose thereby contributing to some element of our overall set
of beliefs about the world. In this discussion we focus on openness in a conceptual context and not on physical
intervention. The conceptual stock is conceived of as a set of beliefs, acquired consciously or unconsciously over
time, for example convictions based on (scientiﬁc) information, but also regional, cultural or religious convictions,
traditions, prejudices, experience, reﬂection etc. The conceptual stock is later modelled as a set of propositions at
the disposal of a human from which subsets can be employed in a given reasoning process.
We hold for this discussion the today well accepted view that reasoning and rationality considered as a function of
context is too naive a notion, what has already been observed by Putnam (1982):
What I am saying is that the "standards" accepted by a culture or a subculture, either explicitly or
implicitly, cannot deﬁne what reason is, even in context, because they presuppose reason (reasonableness)
for their interpretation. On the one hand, there is no notion of reasonableness at all without cultures,
practices, procedures; on the other hand, the cultures, practices, procedures we inherit are not an
algorithm to be slavishly followed.
Indeed it seems appropriate to ascertain that any account of reasoning must incorporate a notion of context
in some sense. However, the dualistic view that one determines the other in terms of correctness (when context
determines reason) or in terms of rationality (when normative reason determines context) seems to not suﬃciently
respect the complexity of human reasoning. We think that one cause for the blatant divergence of actual human
reasoning (and acting) and an expected reasoning outcomes according to normative accounts of rationality, is the
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integrative nature of human reasoners. Akin to the processing of a sensation in the brain that requires the whole
brain to (passively) partake1, a reasoning process of a human requires the whole person's internal and external
capacities2 to partake.
It seems when literature is consulted, that the complex nature of integrated reasoning (in the reading of human
reasoning) retaliates strict or inﬂexible accounts and hence is diﬃcult to model, both for formal modelling approaches
and conceptual modelling approaches.
Formal modelling approaches that are axiomatically monotone abstract logics in the sense of Tarski (1956a)3 are
criticised - inter alia - for the idealisation of logically omniscient reasoners cf. Stalnaker (1991), potentially leading
to unrealistic axiomatic implications. Apart from formalisations of reasoning processes on the highly abstract level
of logical symbolic representation, quantitative accounts are employed as formal modelling approaches. Quantitative
accounts typically stipulate a set of assumptions comparable to the axioms of a logic to ensure certain qualities of
functions and relations deﬁned on sets hold, for which the assumptions are stipulated. The idea is that based on these
assured qualities mathematical representations of natural phenomena as belief can be modelled and assertions can
be proven in the scope of the model. For example, gradual belief of an agent can be modelled as a function assigning
a probability to a (set of) propositions. In that case the probability assignment has to satisfy speciﬁc conditions.
If, and only if these conditions are satisﬁed a measure is a probability measure and assignments legitimately obtain
certain properties which are then interpreted in terms of belief. As Dubois et al. observe in Dubois et al. (2004)
There is an old controversy in the framework of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) between probabilistic
and other numerical representations of uncertainty on the one hand, and the symbolic setting of logical
reasoning methods on the other hand. Namely, the AI tradition maintains that knowledge representation
and reasoning should rely on logic Minker (2000), while the probabilistic tradition sticks to numerical
representations of belief.
In contrast to logical and quantitative modelling approaches, we take conceptual modelling approaches to be
theories of reasoning that model reasoning processes in less formal (but equally rigorous) frameworks. Basically the
modelling consists of interpreting and relating belief and belief change to diﬀerent schools of thought or conceptual
frameworks using theories of reasoning. In that sense we take conceptual approaches to be a kind of linguistic
modelling where natural language terms (words) are accorded a meaning to represent - i.e. to model - a concept.
The capacity to represent a concept requires a notion of context in which the models are meaningful. We call
these natural language contexts schools of thought or conceptual approaches. Examples of conceptual modelling
approaches in literature are Epistemic Normativity discussed for example by Pollock (1987) or Kornblith (1993),
Epistemic Instrumentalism discussed for example by Foley (1987)), or Naturalism discussed for example by Hooker
(1994) and, independently, by Laudan (1990).
Consider naturalistic conceptual modelling approaches. These are typically oriented towards, and inspired by,
empirical research, reﬂecting observable behaviours of human reasoners to derive normative conceptual frameworks.
For example Hooker (1994) and Hoﬀmaster and Hooker (2009) write
Roughly, reason is a capacity, operating at both individual and collective levels, for initiating pro-
cesses that replace ignorance with trustworthy information, reactivity and carelessness with systematic
judgement, and prejudice and partiality with broad and insightful critical appraisal, and for applying
these to rational evaluation processes themselves.
Both, formal (logical or quantitative) and conceptual accounts face various criticisms that can be separated
in two generalizing categories: empirical inadequacy and conceptual controversy (or inconsistency) that are of
particular relevance if accounts are normative (and not purely descriptive).
For example Hoﬀmaster and Hooker (2009, p.221) conclude that reasoning processes, what they take them to
be, are too diverse and that Formal tools have a useful role to play in these processes, but only as one resource
among several. It seems that formal tools are per se considered to be empirically inadequate to model multifaceted
human reasoning.
Naturalistic conceptual accounts on their part are often criticised for their indeﬁniteness or little demanding nor-
mative standards. The way often walked to criticise non-formal accounts is an analysis of the conceptual embedding
and interpretation, pointing at improper simpliﬁcations, conceptual imbalances, or downright contradictions.
For example, Chow (2016, p.3) criticises Hooker (1994) pointing at the insuﬃciency of internalist reasoning
concepts, albeit empirically adequate, to claim normativity. He says:
1Even if processing may, depending on the sensation, be predominantly located in one areal.
2Even if reasoning may, depending on the proposition in question, be predominantly logical, emotional, intuitive, etc.
3E.g. propositional logic cf. Shoenﬁeld (1967) but also modal logic concisely presented by Emerson (1990), and also binary proba-
bilistic logics by Fagin et al. (1990) or Nilsson (1986).
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Hoﬀmaster and Hooker's analysis [..] considers only explicit conscious experience and fails to consider
underlying (generally nonconscious) psychological processes. This reveals a danger for naturalism of
mischaracterizing the activities and/or cognitive processes of agents when evaluating their performance,
which can cloud the targets of normative analysis.
In our reading, Chow criticises the appointment of individual reasoning observations that include nonconscious
phenomena of that individual, to general rules of reasoning that ought to apply to many individuals, as such
an appointment may not provide a normative setting. Epistemic norms and norms ensuring empirical adequacy
are relevant if the modelled theories of reason and rationality aspire to be normative and not purely descriptive.
Epistemic norms are, generally speaking, concerned with knowledge, truth, and justiﬁcation. Let us regard the
epistemic norm Norm of truth by Joyce (1998).
An epistemically rational agent must strive to hold a system of full beliefs that strikes the best
attainable overall balance between the epistemic good of fully believing truths and the epistemic evil of
fully believing falsehoods (where fully believing a truth is better than having no opinion about it, and
having no opinion about a falsehood is better than fully believing it).
Scientiﬁc interrogation and reasoning generally ought to adhere to the epistemic norm of truth, and from that
demand operational standards for empirical investigations are derived to ensure norm compliance, for example by
demanding suﬃciently large sample sizes, diversity of experimentees ensuring samples are representative for the
population, etc. Meeting the relevant standards is crucial if an account claims to be a epistemically trustworthy
analysis of reason, as the operational correctness amounts to a justiﬁcation of claims based on empirical analysis.
Claims derived from evidence of experimental setups that are designed and operated according to scientiﬁc standards
are generally assumed to be justiﬁed, or at least criticizable or falsiﬁable, because it is assumed that the evidence
is generated lege artis. Empirical observation and evidential conﬁrmation are particularly relevant to justify some
claims of naturalistic accounts treating observation as a source of unbiased, reliable information. Interpreting the
empirical data and supporting accounts of reason with these data then should adhere to the epistemic norm of
truth. As Wilholt (2013) clariﬁes To invest epistemic trust in someone is to trust her in her capacity as provider
of information.
If the norm of truth is not entrenched in a theory of reasoning, in particular in naturalistic accounts, the derived
characterisation of cognitive processes is endangered to be a mere generalisation instead of a normative analysis.
The preferential course of action today to meet both normative standards in theory and empirically adequacy in
modelling, are accounts incorporating both human limited or insuﬃcient compliance to rules in reasoning and solid
axiomatic settings supporting some notion of rationality. Obviously, this comes at the expense of simplicity. The
rigid frameworks of classical logics, quantitative frameworks, and conceptual de dicto theories are weakened to
account for observable human caprices in actual reasoning processes.
Theories are altered both formally, i.e. by introduction of axioms in formal accounts, and interpretatively, i.e. by
a de re interpretation of theories of reasoning in conceptual accounts. The result are complex modelling approaches
both in formal form and in form of conceptual theories of reasoning.
Formal accounts adapt in particular two aspects to accommodate human reasoning naturalistically in axiomatic
frameworks 1) deductive cogency concerning the required strength of rule obedience (e.g. the scope of inferences),
and 2) truth conductive consequence relations, leading to so-called paraconsistent logics. Informal accounts incor-
porate human reasoning naturalistically in particular in 1) interpretative rigour concerning aspects of a concept
being (de-)emphasized relative to a conventional interpretation 2) conceptual interrelation, where familiarities are
analysed and interpretations are related.
Let an example of a naturalistic formal account be the proposed logic of Allo (2016) that divides hard and soft
information and relates both to an axiomatic setting in a diluted logical space. Or Lavendhomme and Lucas, who
partializes logical omniscience while keeping a classical logic structure.
Naturalistic quantitative notions model for example weaker representations of gradual belief than classical
probability4. For example ranking theories e.g. Spohn (2012), possibility theory by Zadeh (1979), or axiomati-
cally altered notions of probability, so-called Popper-Renyi-measures, can be regarded as less stringent quantitative
modelling frameworks for belief. Considering the credence assignments of an agent conditional on the context is
proposed in the following sections, what amounts to a Popper-Renyi-measure where conditional probabilities are
the primitive notion of probability, e.g. van Fraassen (1976). The algebraically restrictive properties of probability
4As is done in Probabilistic Uncertainty to incorporate and emphasize relative relevance and context.
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measures (in particular the additivity property5 may be considered unsuitable to model human belief and belief
changes empirically adequate. Possibility measures (and the concomitant necessity measures) provide a less re-
strictive framework, as Dubois et al. (1993) clarify: The possibilistic representation is weaker because it explicitly
handles imprecision (e.g. incomplete knowledge) and because possibility measures are based on an ordering struc-
ture rather than an additive one.
The examples for complex conceptual modelling approaches developing theories of reasoning and rational belief
appealing to various schools of thought are vast. We highlight but one particularly appealing combination of schools
of thought, Elqayam (2012)'s Grounded Rationality, which is based on the related principles of descriptivism and
(moderate) epistemic relativism.
The in the following presented proposal too is characterised by a degree of complexity. We call the approach we
put up for discussion and criticisms Probabilistic Uncertainty and it does exactly what it says: it probabilistically
models the rational uncertainty of a human agent in her/his belief in a given context, where a context is a set of
propositions considered to be possible by that agent, and the evaluation is relative to an evaluation criterion.
The key concepts we employ are uncertain belief and accepted truth. Uncertain belief is a concept which quanti-
tatively models gradual belief in terms of probabilities. Accepted truth is a concept which models belief simpliciter
in terms of possibilities. A context is a sovereignly chosen set of propositions accepted to be possible (accepted
truths), forming an epistemic state of the agent modelled quantitatively in a logical framework with a semantic
interpretation. Rationality is deﬁned in the scope of a context reﬂecting the context propositions' capacity to rep-
resent a rationality criterion according to the agents judgement.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next sections three perspectives on Probabilistic Uncertainty
are discussed, providing ﬁrst a conceptual frame for the two concepts of belief employed, secondly the numerical
modelling of these belief concepts, and thirdly the logical modelling of these belief concepts.
The conceptual framework concerning accepted truth and uncertain belief ought to facilitate an unequivocal
understanding of the intended meaning of the concepts, using their embedding in literature and diﬀerent schools of
thought, to formulate a notion of rationality. In particular the grounding in the internalism/externalism debate is
discussed. Based on these considerations the adequate conceptual paradigm for belief modelling with Probabilistic
Uncertainty is developed.
In section 3 the quantitative framework is presented, which is basic probability theory. In particular, considering
accepted truth as a notion of possibility boils down to a binary probability assignment for any context within
which the agent reasons, called the epistemic state, assuring non-negativity and hence allowing for a classical
Kolmogorovian axiomatisation of uncertain beliefs determined within a context.
In section 4 the logical frameworks developed by Banerjee and Dubois (2014) for accepted truth and the frame-
work developed by Fagin, Halpern, and Megiddo (in Fagin et al. (1990) and Fagin and Halpern (1991)) are discussed
as frameworks formally reﬂecting the concepts and accommodating the probabilistic characterisation of uncertain
belief in the modal operators for accepted truth T and uncertain belief B ∼.
Finally, in section 5 we discuss some expected consequences the modelling process of Probabilistic Uncertainty
might deliver for the testifying agent and the modeller.
2 The Conceptual Perspective
Probabilistic Uncertainty aims to reﬂect human reasoning processes in an empirically adequate manner. In this
sense it can be regarded as a naturalistic approach, or at least, with aspirations towards a naturalistic philosophy of
reason. However, Probabilistic Uncertainty is not solely a descriptive theory. In particular, we consider the notion
of rationality to be normative. On that note the epistemic norm of truth is fundamental to our deﬁnition of rational
belief. However, we interpret truth to be a concept immanently holding both external information and internal
information of a human agent.
Naturalistic accounts concentrating on empirical adequacy generally run the risk of emphasizing single case
correspondence at the expense of normative austerity, so that any approach (conceptual, logical, or quantitative)
must pay particular attention to balancing human individuality and modelling idealisation. The basis for the
evaluation of human reasoning processes is, generally, compliance with a given set of assumptions formulated as
premises, axioms, or deﬁnitions, according to the theory of reason in question. Typically, a reasoning process and
5The additivity property is often blamed to demand inferences in sharp contrast to empirical observation. The problem is illustrated
by the Lottery Paradox and the Elsberg Paradox.
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its result is called rational provided it conforms to the axiomatic standards. A necessary condition for rationality
evaluation altogether is hence the possibility of communication and inter-subjective understanding.
2.1 Internalsim and Externalism
If a reasoning process calls upon human facilities that cannot be communicated, the compliance with axioms cannot
be analysed by another agent or modeller. The inter-subjective prerequisite restricts the assignment of the quality
predicate rational and potentially discriminates parts of human reasoning that are accessible exclusively within
a human. In literature these reasoning structures and sources of information are referred to as internal, and the
corresponding view is called internalism. We take internalism to hold that a human can attain insight by an
information generating process that is strictly independent of external inﬂuences, for example reﬂection, sensing,
understanding, enlightenment, change of perspective etc.
Reasoning processes that are strictly independent of external inﬂuences may or may not be enunciated by a
reasoner. If they are not (or cannot be formulated in an inter-subjectively understandable way) a general suspicion
of irrationality seems to accompany beliefs held on that basis. The prejudice of potential irrationality can be
exempliﬁed with subjective probability assignments, discussed in the following section.
Compliance with the epistemic norm approximate the truth6 for gradual belief is facilitated by a notion of
rationality respectful of both subjective conviction arising from strictly internal reasoning processes and subjective
conviction arising from factual truth and evidence external to the reasoner. To relate the following discussion
of the basic concepts truth, awareness, and rationality to the consequent modelling, we brieﬂy present the core
constituents of the approach.
In Probabilistic Uncertainty an agent has to choose propositions deemed possible, called the accepted truths,
forming the context for probability assignments. We model accepted truth as belief simpliciter and gradual belief
as probability and uncertainty assignments. We call the conscious choice of a context intention. An agent is
expected to balance her/his uncertain belief arising from internal information, called internal subjective belief,
and external information called external subjective belief. The quantitative modelling amounts to a probabilistic
credence function reﬂecting radical subjective probability and objective probability if the agent's intention is non-
extreme. The agent balances her/his uncertain belief based on an understanding of her/his individual extremes
what reﬂects the reasoning process itself.
The two extremes are (1) an agent's intention to evaluate uncertain belief in purely internal subjective terms,
then, accepted truths will be chosen accordingly, allowing for credence assessments arising from internal reasoning
processes7. Or, (2) an agent's intention to evaluate uncertain belief in purely external subjective terms, then,
accepted truths will be chosen accordingly allowing for objective probability assessments8. Both extremes satisfy
the epistemic norm of truth approximation, the former in terms of subjective truth (conviction), the latter in form
of inter-subjective truth (observable fact). A less extreme intention introduces a mixture of inter-subjective truth
and subjective conviction such that the uncertain belief expressed as probability assignment by an agent is an
individually balanced credence function for given accepted possibilities.
2.2 Truth
We considerer truth to be a quality of both the world and the agent evaluating the world. Evaluating the outside
world, i.e. the inter-subjectively veriﬁable world, demands for external reasoning processes, while evaluating the
`inside world, i.e. the strictly internal reality of the agent, demands for internal reasoning processes. Both have
to enter in the modelling of reasoning processes. We employ two concepts of truth: on the one hand in a Tarsikan
sense of correspondence for the formulation of the formal modelling in terms propositions. On the other hand,
truth is understood as the aptitude of such propositions to represent a concept for the agent in question. The
representation theory of truth can, in a sense, mirror an agent's individual understanding of the meta language
when probabilities are assigned. The epistemic norm of truth applies in our understanding to both a correct
correspondence (externalism) and a sincere representation of individual understanding (internalism).
The evaluation of the inter-subjective aspects of truth in the light of the correspondence theory of truth by
Tarski (1944)9 evolves around Convention T for the T-scheme cf. Lynch (2001), discussed critically for example by
6An epistemically rational agent must evaluate partial beliefs on the basis of their gradational accuracy, and she must strive to hold
a system of partial beliefs that, in her best judgement, is likely to have an overall level of gradational accuracy at least as high as that
of any alternative system she might adopt. Joyce (1998)
7The radical subjective interpretation of probabilism in the spirit of de Finetti, as rational degrees of belief can accommodate such
an understanding.
8The frequentist, classical, and propensity interpretations of probabilism can accommodate such an understanding.
9And Tarski (1956b).
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Patterson (2002) or Davidson (1973). Roughly sketched, Tarski's T-scheme uses a sentence in an object language,
say, p: 'snow is white', and deﬁnes truth using a meta language to which p corresponds, say X. The object language
is the language for which we are giving a theory of truth deﬁned as material adequacy, such that p is true iﬀ snow
is white, while the meta language is used to state the theory, such that X is true iﬀ p. The introduction of a meta
language responds to the problem of the liar paradox, as truth is not decidable on the same level, i.e. within an
object language, for sentences like I am lying. The correspondence evaluation of p's truth is necessarily inter-
subjective, such that a number of agents could decide p in the meta-language because p corresponds to something
multiple agents can evaluate in a meta-language. This requirement is called formal correctness by Tarski.
On the other hand, truth in an object language, say English, deﬁned as material adequacy may not always be
obvious. Whether a sentence in the object language is materially adequate for an agent, is a highly individual,
non-standardised process involving subjective understanding, interpretation and meaning. We consider the capacity
of a term (or sentence) in an object language to materially adequately represent the understanding of an individual
agent to be gradual. In model theory the term interpretation is generally taken to be a bit of information making
a statement true or false. Therefore, we employ the term representation to explicitly denote the not necessarily
correspondence-truth relevant information added or lost when a human agent testiﬁes on a proposition, which is
implicit in the agent's understanding of the proposition. We consider the statement that an agent is uncertain that
a proposition is true in the object language not in the logical sense of truth but rather as a kind of appropriateness
of the proposition depending on the agent's understanding.
The semantic representation theory of truth developed by Kamp (2013, p.190) (emphasis by Kamp), in a sense
captures the spirit of truth qua representation we think of:
A sentence S, or discourse D, with representation m is true in a model M if and only if M is compatible
with m; and compatibility of M with m can be deﬁned as the existence of a proper embedding of m into
M, where a proper embedding is a map from the universe of m into that of M which, roughly speaking
preserves all the properties and relations which m speciﬁes of the elements of its domain.
In that vein, a person evaluating p would consider p to be a representation, just in case it conforms to the agents'
individual understanding of the concept(s) p refers to. In our interpretation, the proper embedding of representation
m in a model M is present if the map of m to M indeed preserves all the properties and relations an agent
individually10 holds to exist. However, a representation can hold but some of the properties and relations an agent
individually accredits. A degraded representation from the agent's point of view, is a representation m in M
that does not preserve all properties and relations the agent considers relevant to call m in M embedded properly.
We model a degraded representation using a quantitative assessment, the probability assignment, what allows the
agent to rate the properties and relations missing in the representation of m in M, individually according to the
agent's judgement of relevance. We map m to M using a probability assignment where a probability assignment of
1 corresponds to a complete representation and a probability assignment of 0 corresponds to complete mismatch
of properties and/or relations the agent considers relevant to call m in M embedded properly. In the modelling we
evaluate with uncertain belief the agent's judgement to what extent a sentence we transferred to a diﬀerent context
via syntactic consequence, still corresponds to the same sentence in the object language for the agent, in a sense
we ask the agent if the sentence feels equally materially adequate in her/his understanding11.
Let us provide an example to illustrate what we mean by internal reasoning process, external reasoning process,
correspondence, and representation. Let p denote 'I have a mother'. Now, obviously this sentence is true for every
human, by biological necessity. The inter-subjective part of p's material adequacy is evaluated for the term mother,
deﬁned as a person who gives birth to a child, what is inter-subjectively veriﬁable.
However, we do not all have the same mother, such that the term mother is multifaceted and means diﬀerent
things to diﬀerent people. The extent to which an individual person accords truth to p reﬂects that persons' internal
truth that p represents her/his understanding of the concept mother in the context of that sentence. The extent
to which p is true by virtue of representation is determined by the agent's individuality as it is the basis for the
concept's properties and/or relations the agent considers relevant. The degree to which (a term ﬁguring in) a
sentence, represents an agent's understanding of the concept it denotes, depends on a persons' understanding which
is inﬂuenced by, for example, historical experiences, education, upbringing, desires, social environment, physical
environment, and political, religious, philosophical convictions.
Maybe an individual agent was adopted and feels inclined to say I have two mothers. A biological and a social
mother. Maybe the mother of an agent has deceased and the agent feels inclined to say I don't have a mother any
more.
10We emphasize that individual refers to an agent's speciﬁc situation taking into account historic experience, internal reasoning
structures, physical sensations, mental relations, etc.
11So we could say that Probabilist Uncertainty is not a ceteris paribus modelling approach.
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The meaning of the concept mother by an agent is individual and is evaluated by criteria speciﬁc to a person,
e.g. being present and caring, being alive. However, the individual understanding is not generally equivalent to
(gradual) disbelief in p. If the agent is uncertain that the representation of mother in p captures her/his individual
understanding of the concept we say that she/he holds uncertain belief in p that is, in her/his understanding p is
a degraded representation, though not necessarily false. That is a very basic example to illustrate what we take
representation to hold in the sense of individual meaning for the agent. In the modelling process the agent is provided
an evaluation criterion, called rationality, for which p is assessed. We are interested how strong the agent believes
p represents the evaluation criterion - whatever the agents' understanding of p and the evaluation criterion may
be. In the modelling process we are not interested in the agents the individual context, her/his biography or why a
speciﬁc understanding arose. Rather, we are interested in the modelling context: how the agent's understanding of
a proposition is related to other propositions, and to the evaluation criterion. Uncertainty is deﬁned accordingly in
deﬁnition 2. The subjective probability assigned to p models a degraded representation of the evaluation criterion
by P (p) < 1 making the uncertainty and strength of belief quantitatively explicit. Uncertain belief, expressed
quantitatively as probability and uncertainty is denoted by B ∼ p in the logical framework. To sum up, assigning a
probability to a sentence in an object language reﬂects the capacity of that sentence to represent truth individually
for the assigning agent. That which is uncertainly believed can be gradually represented in the object language,
reﬂecting how an agent understands a concept in terms of relations and properties.
2.3 The Awareness Paradigm
In our view, the purpose of beliefs is not primarily the correct reﬂection of an inter-subjectively observable reality.
The beliefs we model are conceived as representation of an agent's individual attitude expressed vis-à-vis a concept
reﬂecting the agent's acceptance, commitment and identiﬁcation, if you will. An agent's choice to accept a
possibility and her/his assignment of her/his uncertain belief in that possibility are inseparable from internal
information structures. The attitude is modelled in the two notions of truth: correspondence for accepted possibility
and representation for uncertain belief.
In contrast, the gradational norm of truth seems to be predominantly understood as a kind of expectation based
on factual correct probability calculus. Probabilism and countable additivity are epistemic norms for credence
functions, i.e. functions describing the strength of belief. The assignment of a probabilistic credence function based
on objective evidence reﬂects awareness of frequencies in a calibrated sense.
The Principal Principle by Lewis published in Carnap and Jeﬀrey (1980), says that a rational agent conforms
their credences to the chances: the chance distribution at a time and a world comes from any reasonable initial
credence function by conditionalising on the complete history of the world up to the time, together with the complete
theory of chance for the world. Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) call such a view accuracy-ﬁrst epistemology.
Rationality, if deﬁned as credences conform to the chances, is a function of a world's history up to the time and the
complete theory of chance for the world.
Rationality would become a function of resource availability. Clearly such an understanding facilitates all sorts
of discrimination. A blind person does not dispose of visual instruments to assess aspects of the complete history
for conditionalisation. Poor people are not likely to dispose of technical instruments to assess aspects of complete
history for conditionalisation. A person who lacks schooling is not likely to have access to the complete theory
of chance for the world. Understood as such, modelling beliefs is a decision problem: a belief based on a more
complete history of a world is more rational and the agent who wants to believe rationally should conform her/his
credence. But what is the (part of a) world's complete history to conditionalise on? What is the complete theory
of chance for that world to determine one's credence?
Rational credence understood as chance gives advantage to the agent who disposes of the best instruments to
test factual correct history and a complete theory of chance. The agent endowed with these prerequisites holds the
right beliefs and believes rational after conditionalisation for a given theory of chance. That in turn bears on
the blind or poor person's aptitude to conform to the norm of truth as it impacts the possibility to assess material
adequacy. The reason why (today) a blind person is typically not considered irrational qua physical condition, is
that the person can assess factual truth by 'other means' than visual stimuli-processing. The reason why today a
poor person is typically not considered irrational qua economic condition is that the person could assess factual
truth if only she/he were given the technical instruments. What 'other means' and what technical instruments an
agent relies on, or what sources of external information she/he trusts to generate the chances to which the credence
ought to be conform, is a decision problem.
We propose that for belief in our understanding the epistemic norm of truth should demand for both factual
correctness and individual understanding. In other words, belief is not a decision problem.
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Belief is an awareness problem.
In our modelling approach an agent uses beliefs to become aware of (1) her/his accepted propositions, (2)
her/his uncertain belief in accepted propositions, and (3) her/his interpretation of a proposition w.r.t a rationality.
Awareness rather than correctness is desirable and normative when beliefs in our understanding are evaluated. The
question shifts from 'whom should I trust to hold the right (rational) beliefs', to whom do I (rationally) trust,
including myself . When answering the latter question the agent investigates what information is trusted reﬂecting
the agent's acceptance, commitment and identiﬁcation. Non-judgemental awareness fosters recognition of all
beliefs held by the agent, not just the correct beliefs.
An overemphasis of inter-subjectively veriﬁable aspects of belief may be disadvantageous for agents complying to
the epistemic norm of truth. Associating rationality with a world's history and chance theory may severely mismatch
the true convictions of an agent, potentially leading to neglect and a biased self understanding what we consider to
be a form of self-deception. A practical consequence we anticipate if chance rationality is overemphasized in the
norm of truth, is that the designed human, the normatively correct agent, is potentially at odds with what the
true human actually believes, considers reasonable, and feels. Therefore, we do not interpret the norm of truth
solely in terms of chance rationality but in the paradigm of awareness.
2.4 Rationality in the Awareness Paradigm
A proposition p modelled in a meta-language is said to be true if it (1) corresponds to some concept in a object
language, i.e. an inter-subjective language e.g. English, and (2) can bear (gradual) truth of being a representation
for the human evaluating her/his belief. Let the representation p can bear be called rationality. In other words, the
proposition p represents for the non-ideal agent an instance of a rationality.
In contrast to interpretations of probability as the Frequentist account, the classical account, and the propensity
account, the probabilities we instrumentalize to model gradual beliefs in the paradigm of awareness need not
necessarily reﬂect occurrence. Diﬀerent rationalities, i.e. evaluation criteria, apart from occurrence rationality
are natural to the human agent, for example economic rationality (e.g. how strong does p represent least cost?),
practical rationality (e.g. how strong does p represent least eﬀort?), moral rationality (e.g. how strong does
p represent goodness?), consensual rationality (e.g. how strong does p represent expert consent?), instrumental
rationality (e.g. how strong does p represent eﬀectiveness?), aesthetic rationality (e.g. how strong does p represent
beauty?), etc. Uncertain belief in a proposition p is interpreted as the non-ideal agent's evaluation of p's capacity
to represent a rationality in a given context, where the context is determined by propositions accepted to be true
forming the set T. Accepting a proposition means that the agent asserts she/he considers that it is possible for p
to represent the evaluation criterion. In order for p to gradually represent something, it must be possible for p to
represent that something.
We entertain the view that a given set of accepted truths necessitates a unique strength of uncertain belief
in a proposition accepted, speciﬁc to an agent and speciﬁc to a belief evaluation. We contend that an individual
agent knows that strength of uncertain belief for an intentional set of accepted truths if the agent calls on both
internal and external information resources12. That tacit knowledge is understood as hard knowledge in the sense
of Aumann (1999), as irrevocable S5 knowledge for a given belief evaluation situation. Given these assumptions we
say that an agent believes rationally if her/his strength of belief does not diﬀer from her/his assigned subjective
probability. Note, that subjective probability is understood as credence based on internal information and/or
external information.
Deﬁnition 1. (Rational Belief)
It is rational to uncertainly believe, denoted B ∼, a proposition p exactly with the probability P (p) and uncertainty
Ψ(p) the proposition has for a non-ideal agent given the set of propositions considered possible, called accepted truths,
for a rationality in a single belief evaluation.
In other words, it is rational mischief to believe with a diﬀerent strength or be uncertain with a diﬀerent strength
than testiﬁed in the probability assignment. This is applicable for both grounds of subjective probability, internal
and external information. Moreover, believing rational is about the most adequate context for the probability
assignment reﬂecting the intention of the non-ideal agent. To be clear, our terminology of uncertain belief does not
refer to an agents insecurity, indecisiveness, or some psychological restraint. It models the agents awareness that the
object language and meta-language can be understood in diﬀerent ways as these languages may support diﬀerent
relations and properties resulting in diﬀerent meanings. Conforming convictions to an inter-subjective language
12Calling on both internal and external information amounts to investigating the extreme intentions.
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introduces uncertainty in that sense, what is captured by our notion of context. Context is modelled as accepted
possibilities, serving the purpose of becoming aware of all accepted propositions and their relative strength in terms
of uncertain belief.
Answering the question what a rational agent should believe on the object level in a belief modelling framework
does not make sense for an account aspiring empirical adequacy. The object level is the (uncertain) belief of an
agent in a proposition p modelled. In other words, rationality on the object level is concerned with distinguishing
p based on qualities p may have, reﬂecting material adequacy. The predicate rational is then conferred to agents,
and only those agents, who happen to decide to believe the right p, and with the right strength, from the view of
chance theory.
Our notion of rationality is vested in the meta-level. The question we pose is what a rational agent does believe
given the possibilities accepted. In general we consider the agent to testify sincerely. In other words, we say:
whatever the propositions the agent accepts are, and whatever the strength of belief in these propositions is, based
on what the agent takes them to mean, if the credence function we model (the probability assignment) reﬂects the
strength of belief of the agent, the agent is considered to be rational.
In the paradigm that belief is an awareness problem, rather than a decision problem, evaluating one's beliefs
demands for a thorough investigation of accepted possibilities and their gradual representation capacity by the
human agent, potentially laying bare implicit beliefs, entrenched beliefs, and contextual beliefs that remained
unconscious prior to the belief evaluation.
The epistemic value of increased awareness becomes manifest whenever an agent learns something about her-
self/himself - gets to know herself/himself better - due to a belief evaluation. In order to realize the epistemic
value of a belief evaluation, the agent ought to aspire holding rational beliefs, as rational beliefs are likely to foster
awareness in an internal and inter-subjective sense. If an agent does not seek to hold rational beliefs according to
deﬁnition 1, three forms of rational misconduct can be identiﬁed.
2.5 The good, the bad, and the ugly
Rational misconduct of an agent can occur in three forms: wishful believing (the good), doubtful believing (the
bad), and denial (the ugly). In these three cases the agent biases her/his belief. Intentional and unintentional forms
of misconduct are possible.
Intentional misconduct occurs when the agent introduces accepted truths to purposefully change, that is to bias,
her/his probability and uncertainty of a proposition. Unintentional misconduct occurs when the agent believes
with a diﬀerent strength or uncertainty than her/his probability assignment expresses due to a disparity in the
perception of belief and probability, for example an over- or underestimation.
Wishful believing is belief biased towards a positive probability and uncertainty, from the agent's point of
view. The agent, for some reason, desires a proposition to be more/less probable than she actually considers it
to be. The agent wants to belief a proposition stronger (less strong) than she/he actually can, for a given set of
accepted truths.
In the case of doubtful believing, for some reason, the agent wants to be more uncertain of, a proposition than
she/he can, a given set of accepted truths.
Denial, (not facing the ugly truth) can also occur intentionally and unintentionally. An agent commits uninten-
tional denial if beliefs inﬂuence an agents' belief evaluation that remain unconscious, for example in form of implicit
beliefs, prejudices, etc. Intentional denial is the purposeful exclusion of propositions whose relevance the agent is
aware of from the accepted truths of a belief evaluation.
We do not care too much about intentional rational mischief. The intentional introduction, denial or neglect
of relevant propositions is known to the agent and biases are designed purposefully. We do not judge intentional
rational mischief and respect an agents choice to do so in the modelling. Many are the reasons we can think of for
such irrational behaviour. For example agents who have undergone trauma may know to be unable to emotionally
cope without biases. Or agents who know to be jeopardized by depression without positive biases. Intentional
rational mischief is not considered problematic because the agent knows that biases are at play, and we assume that
these biases are created for a reason. The most obvious reason we assume is that these biases allow the agent to
function in a practical way, that is in a social environment, and hence are actually not irrational. Their rationality
is simply not covered by our deﬁnition of rationality. It is covered by social behaviourism. We assume that an agent
will stop performing intentional mischief when the time has come.
Studies in cognitive psychology and psychological behaviourism underpin the existence of structural biases we
call rational mischief. The availability heuristic is, roughly, the phenomenon that familiarity with an interpretation
or an outcome in a decision situation increases the subjective probability an agent assigns. Tversky and Kahneman
(1973, p.230) write:
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Continued preoccupation with an outcome may increase its availability, and hence its perceived
likelihood. People are preoccupied with highly desirable outcomes, such as winning, or highly undesir-
able outcomes, such as an air plane crash. Consequently availability provides a mechanism by which
occurrences of extreme utility (or disutility) may appear more likely than they actually are.
In the case of subjective belief generated by purely internal reasoning processes, it is not possible to proof or
criticise someone else performs intentional or unintentional misconduct. If the subjective probability assignments
are based on both internal and external reasoning processes, it may - to a limited extent - be possible to point at
another person's rational mischief.
From a conceptual perspective judgement and/or denunciation of rational misconduct is not our primary concern.
The epistemic norm of truth is expected to guide a human agent to the awareness that she/he commits intentional
and/or unintentional rational misconduct in repeated belief evaluation situations. Here we do not necessarily think
of repeated belief evaluations for the same set of accepted truths, say Ta, giving rise to rational mischief. It may be
easier or necessary for an agent to become aware of implicit assumptions or structural biases relevant for context
Ta in a diﬀerent reasoning context Tb. However, eventually, if the agent complies to the epistemic norm of truth,
subjective belief based on both purely internal reasoning process and reasoning process involving external veriﬁable
information will guide the agent to rational, i.e. unbiased, beliefs.
The framework provides a setting that allows and facilitates the evaluation of rational belief by the agent. If the
awareness paradigm is accepted the agent will seek to correct unintentional rational mischief. Indeed, as will become
clear in later sections, formally, the agent's beliefs are modelled as testiﬁed reﬂecting intentional and unintentional
mischief in Probabilistic Uncertainty.
Deﬁning rationality as the sincere truthful assignment of individual credences reﬂects a non-discriminative,
respectful attitude in a belief evaluation. Frameworks which distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs
potentially neglect in their modelling beliefs disobedient with criteria. While this may be appropriate for strictly
normative modelling accounts, for Probabilistic Uncertainty it is inappropriate as we aspire empirical adequacy.
In particular, an agent may be unaware of rational mischief. Misconduct need not necessarily be purposeful
by an agent. The agent may simply not know that relevant propositions are not included in the set of accepted
propositions, or an included proposition can be more/less probable by the light of evidence. Generally, we do not
call any belief irrational in the awareness paradigm, as any probability assignment reﬂects the agent's individual
internal and external information.
The interplay between subjective beliefs based on internal information and subjective beliefs based on objective
evidence is not considered to be a matter of one dominating the other. Rather, the agent allows one to relativize
the other, according to the agent's (more or less extreme) intention introducing contextual possibilities. That is,
an observation classiﬁed as evidence does not per se have the power to change the aspects of subjective belief that
originate in internal reasoning structures of an agent - safe upon choice.
Equivalently, we do not consider internal subjective belief to have the power to change evidence. In contrast to
many rational belief theories we assert that rational belief is insuﬃciently characterised by conﬁrmation, in the sense
of objective evidence. In particular, we do not consider correcting internal subjective beliefs to match empirical
evidence as rational action. In the awareness paradigm our aspiration is the presentation and modelling of testiﬁed
beliefs by a rational agent, not the discrimination, denunciation, or disdain of what the agent beliefs on the object
level.
The above mentioned prejudice (or suspicion) that subjective beliefs originating in internal reasoning processes
of an gent are potentially irrational is a major criticism of subjective probability. The attitude towards probabilities
that are assigned based predominantly on internal subjective judgement, called radical subjectivism, is formulated
in literature. For example Hájek (2007, p. 577) writes
The radical subjectivist's epistemology is so spectacularly permissive that it sanctions opinions that
we would normally call ridiculous. For example, you may with no insult to rationality assign probability
0.999 to George Bush turning into a prairie dog, provided that you assign 0.001 to this not being the
case (and that your other assignments also obey the probability calculus). And you are no more or
less worthy of praise if you assign it 0,12 or 0.17485, or 1/e or whatever you like. Your probability
assignments can be completely at odds with the way the world is, and thus are `guides' in name only.
Radical subjectivism indeed conﬂicts with rationality if we want probability assignments to reﬂect expectancy
of what might happen, a guide to life as Hájek's formulates it. The criticism is sometimes adopted in probabilistic
belief modelling. Basically the argument is that if a belief is rational it ought not be at odds with the real world.
But beliefs are intrinsically subjective. Associating gradual belief with probability (and uncertainty) necessitates a
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radically subjective dimension if we want to express beliefs and not mere observational facts. An agent modelled
in Probabilistic Uncertainty is not considered to be a device, learning and adjusting beliefs to chance with the
aim to ever better conform belief to observable reality. Expressing beliefs as probabilities is fundamentally distinct
from expressing objective reality as probability distribution. The former employs probability theory to give form
to beliefs (in a quantitative setting), the latter employs observation to give form to a probability distribution what
is a quantitative representation of the observations per se.
If beliefs are designed - both in modelling and understanding - such that they represent a least-error duplicate
of observable reality we do not exploit the full potential of beliefs and fail using them for their very purpose. The
purpose of beliefs, in our view, is to be the bridging (or combining) concept between observable facts and their
interpretation by an agent.
In Probabilistic Uncertainty we do not focus on the conviction-observability conﬂict because the quantitative
probability setting is employed to model beliefs in contrast to using probability as 'guide' to life denoting occurrence
expectancy. The focus is reﬂecting internal reasoning processes and external reasoning processes in an (individually)
balanced manner for a human agent. The underlying normative doctrine is that - even if an individual balances
her/his internal/external reasoning to one extreme - the subjective probability assigned is adequate to meet the
norm of truth in the spirit of belief awareness.
It is our opinion that a non-judgemental attitude in the modelling of an agent's beliefs fosters rational belief un-
derstood as sincere truthful credence assignment, because in that understanding rationality demands the recognition
of all involved beliefs. Only if context beliefs are laid bare and scrutinized for internal and external truthfulness,
completeness, and (un-)intentional biases by the agent, their eﬀect on uncertain belief can be acknowledged by an
agent. We think that awareness of the agent regarding the speciﬁc, individual context beliefs held - which may
be unconscious, neglected, discriminated by the agent - empowers the agent to consciously accept or refuse them.
This in turn allows the agent to make sovereign, independent context choices reducing unintentional and intentional
rational mischief.
3 The Quantitative Perspective
We emphasize that we take subjective probabilities to be the result of internal reasoning processes and/or external
reasoning processes and/or both. Indeed we are convinced that a probability assignment, called a belief evaluation,
is a reasoning process that reﬂects a unique, instantaneous, adequate mixture of internal/external aspects of the
human reasoner. Every belief evaluation demands for a speciﬁc share of internal/external reasoning aspects for a
speciﬁc person in a speciﬁc context reﬂecting the agent's intention. The probability and uncertainty we formally
deﬁne now is to be understood as subjective probabilities resulting from a human agents' (individually adequately
balanced) internal and external reasoning processes.
Deﬁnition 2. (Uncertainty and Probability Measure)
Let V be a measurable space, let F be a σ-algebra13 of V. Let an event14 w ∈ F . A probability measure P(·) is a
ﬁnitely additive measure on F , such that P : F → [0,1] assigns a real number P (w) to every set wi in F , satisfying
the properties (1) P (w) ≥ 0 for all w ∈ F , (2) P(V) = 1, (3) P(⋃ni=1 wi) = ∑ni=1 P(wi) for disjoint sets wi ∈
F . From these axioms one can deduce P (∅) = 0 by taking w = V and monotonicity, that is, if w1 ⊆ w2 then
P (w1) ≤ P (w2). Let the uncertainty Ψ of an event w, denoted by Ψ(w), be assigned concomitantly as the probability
of the complement event(s) of w. In other words, the uncertainty of any (collection of) events in a ﬁnite sample
space can be computed by subtracting the events' probability from the sample space probability, which is by deﬁnition
1, that is Ψ(w) = 1− P (w) = P (wC).
With this deﬁnition we formally capture that uncertainty is not a notion for insecurity of a non-ideal agent for
accepted truths and uncertain belief. In other words, the agent is considered being capable of assigning probabilities.
For accepted truth the binary probability assignment 1 and uncertainty assignment 0 are the formal expression of
accepting the proposition as true possibility. Uncertain belief is expressed as quantitative notion on [0, 1] for the
gradual strength of the agent's belief. Such a credence function must respect that an agent may not want to testify
a probability assignment to every proposition. We follow in for the modelling of propositions the agent suspends
judgement on the framework developed by Fagin and Halpern (1991) [henceforth FHM] where a proposition p (and
13A collection F of subsets of V is said to be a σ-algebra F of subsets of V provided that (1) ∅ ∈ F , (2) F is closed under ﬁnite
intersections
⋂n
i=1 wi ∈ F for countable collections of wi, and (3) if w ∈ F then its complement wC ∈ F , i.e. F is closed under
complementation and countable unions.
14As will become clear we are concerned with propositional valuations w, but for simplicity we denote the objects of the probability
assignment here as events.
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a propositional formula) that is not assigned a probability and uncertainty, is modelled as a nonmeasurable set. To
provide lower and upper bounds on the degree of belief in a nonmeasurable set, the subsets in which the proposition
ﬁgures are consulted where a probability is assigned, i.e. where the agent testiﬁed uncertain belief. To do so, the
probability measure P is extended to the power set of V, the set of all subsets, and the inner and the outer measure
induced by the probability measure is deﬁned, PF(·) and PF(·) for all events w. The original formulation of inner
and outer measures was brought forward by Halmos in 1950, the following deﬁnition is adapted from FHM and
Haenni et al. (2011).
Deﬁnition 3. Let V be a measurable space, let F be a σ-algebra and P (·) be a probability measure as deﬁned in
deﬁnition 2. For the probability space (V, F , P ) the probability measure P (·) can be extended to 2V by deﬁning
the functions PF(·) and PF(·), called the inner and outer measure induced by P for an arbitrary subset w ⊆ V as
follows
PF(w) = sup{P (p)|p ⊆ w and p ∈ F}
PF(w) = inf{P (p)|p ⊇ w and p ∈ F}
where sup denotes the least upper bound and inf denotes the greatest lower bound.
A nonmeasurable set can, by deﬁnition 3, be assigned an interval-valued probability by the inner and outer
measure. The inner measure is the smallest measurable subset of 2V that contains the nonmeasurable event, and
the outer measure can be seen as the largest measurable subset of 2V containing the nonmeasurable event. If w is
a measurable set then PF(w) = PF(w) = P (w). If there are no nonempty measurable sets contained in w, i.e. no
p exist such that p ⊆ w, then PF(w) = 0. Equivalently, if there are no nonempty sets containing w, i.e. no p exist
such that p ⊇ w, then the whole sample space still contains w such that PF(w) = 1.
Criticisms have been formulated emphasizing that the assignment of point probabilities, also called precise
probabilities, are in a sense problematic both concerning their meaning when used as credence function and con-
cerning their legitimacy regarding uncertain (background) assumptions, cf. Weichselberger and Pöhlmann (1990,
p.2). Using interval probabilities to represent credences of agents has become popular in belief modelling based on
the pioneering work of - inter alia - Strassen and Huber (1981), Walley (1991), and Dempster. The in our view
appropriate axiomatic frame to model imprecise probabilities in our approach has been developed by Weichselberger
and Pöhlmann (1990); Weichselberger (1996, 2000); Weichselberger and Augustin (2003) and Augustin and Hable
(2010); Augustin and Coolen (2004). We consider the framework as particularly suitable because the scope of the
theory ﬁts our intentions. In particular the theory accommodates the concept of ambiguity, belief functions and
related concepts, an interpretation of interval-estimates in classical theory, and is not bound to a certain interpre-
tation of probability cf. Weichselberger (2000, p.194). Especially the last quality is of relevance if we seek to model
beliefs of an agent arising from both internal reasoning processes and external reasoning processes. However, the
objections raised by Mayo-Wilson and Wheeler (2016) should be born in mind when using the imprecise framework
for our idea of credence assignments capable of reﬂecting both external information translated to accuracy in the
norm of truth and internal information translated to probability (interval) assignments reﬂecting the credence of
rational agents.
The implementation of an imprecise probability framework is published by Weichselberger, so we only provide
a sketch of the axiomatic frame here. The basic idea of Weichselbergers account is based on Komogorovian prob-
ability extended by two additional axioms, generalizing classical probability to two types of interval probability:
R-probability (reasonable probability) and F-probability (feasible probability). The ﬁrst one is characterized by
employing interval-limits which are not self-contradictory, while the interval-limits of the second (F-probability) ﬁt
exactly to the set of classical probabilities in accordance to these interval-limits (structure) Weichselberger (1996,
p.391).
Given by deﬁnition 2.1 in Weichselberger (2000), with adapted notation, we deﬁne interval probabilities similarly.
Deﬁnition 4. Let a sample space V be a measurable space, let F be a σ-ﬁeld and a set function P(·) be an interval
assignment, denoted by [a] := [a; a] on F , then P(·) is called an R-probability if it obeys the following two axioms.
Note, that a probability assignment P denotes a classical (Kolmogorovian) probability, while P(·) denotes an interval
probability.
(IV) P(w) = [L(w);U(w)] for every w ∈ F
with 0 ≤ L(w) ≤ U(w) ≤ 1 for every w ∈ F .
(V) The set of classical probability functions M satisfying def 2 on Fwith
L(w) ≤ P (w) ≤ U(w) is not empty for every w ∈ F .
3 THE QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVE 14
Let a R-probability ﬁeld R on (V,F) be denoted by R = (V,F , L(·), U(·)). Then a structure M of R is the
non-empty set of Kolmogorovian probability functions M = {P (·)|L(w) ≤ P (w) ≤ U(w)} for every w ∈ F . The
existence of a non-empty structure is a suﬃcient condition for any R-ﬁeld. Necessary conditions for R-probability
are L(∅) = 0 and U(V) = 1. If an R-probability obeys axiom VI it is named an F-probability.
(V I)
inf
P∈M
P (w) = L(w)
sup
P∈M
P (w) = U(w)
 for every w ∈ F
Weichselberger interprets R-probability as not contradictory, but not necessarily perfect because a structure is
permissible, but the limits may not be narrow enough with respect to this structure, what gives rise to redundant
R-probability ﬁelds. F-probability is interpreted as perfect generalization of classical probability to an interval-
valued one. The structure and the interval limits imply each other and hence information about limits is suﬃcient to
construct a F-probability ﬁeldM . The quantitative uncertainty associated with an interval probability corresponds
to the R-probability of an F-probability.
The three concepts brieﬂy presented, Kolmogorovian probability, inner and outer measures, and F-probability
and R-probability are obviously related. Inner and outer measures are related to interval probability as they give
rise to coherent probabilities which can be used to construct F-probability ﬁelds.
In literature aspects of both precise and imprecise probabilities have been extensively researched. Though
mathematically the relations are obvious, diﬀerent schools of thought and the developed theories are to be regarded
independently. For example, for lower previsions introduced by Walley (2000) the natural extension of previsions
avoiding sure loss corresponds to the procedure of constructing the derivable F-probability ﬁeld formulated by
Weichselberger (2000, p.153). On the conceptual level however, Weichselberger (2000, p.150) explicitly stresses
that the domain of application is neither limited to purely formal aspects nor is bound by a certain interpretation
of probability. A thorough analysis in terms of conceptual implications must be left to future work at this point,
but will be comparable to the discussion of the conceptual setting of Walley's account by Miranda (2008), who focus
on the behavioural interpretation of imprecise probabilities. For a mathematical discussion of generalised imprecise
probabilities see Troﬀaes and Destercke (2011).
3.1 Two kinds of belief
The two notions of belief we employ correspond to distinct concepts. A proposition is considered possible by an
agent as belief simpliciter. We call relevant propositions pi that are part of an epistemic state Ei considered possible
by an agent accepted truths, with a strictly bivalent probability assignment denoting the truth assignment of the
agent, that is, belief and disbelief. The intended meaning we accord to an agent's bivalent probability assignment
to a proposition p is 'the agent confers complete subjective conﬁdence in the possibility that p is true.
The second kind of belief modelled is uncertain belief. Uncertain belief denotes gradual belief expressed as
probability and uncertainty on [0,1]. Uncertain belief does not bear on the truth assignment. Uncertain belief is
assigned to propositions or propositional formulae, given a valuation w, that is, a truth assignment by acceptance.
The agent is modelled to be uncertain that the meaning a proposition in the object language has, represents
completely what the agent takes that proposition to mean in terms of relations and properties for a given meta-
epistemic context.
Using the conceptual framework of Probabilism for uncertain belief allows emphasizing the informative potency
of the (super)additive notion in contrast to (pre-)orderings or rankings. We want uncertain belief to reﬂect the
complete certainty in a given epistemic state the agent is capable of, and willing to testify. The familiarity of
human agents with probability, and the intuitive representation of a credence function as probability assignment,
is expected to contribute to naturalistic qualities of the modelling.
Several propositions or propositional formulae can be accepted to be true forming a meta-epistemic context E
for a number of valuations w ∈ E. The meta-epistemic context, i.e. the epistemic states Ei, are subsets of V
containing all valuations of propositions. The set of valuations V is ﬁnite and contains propositions considered
relevant for the agent (for a belief evaluation). The powerset 2V is the set of all subsets of V, including the empty
set and V itself.
Assigning the strongest quantitative notion of subjective belief (probability 1) means to accept a propositions'
truth is possible. This may in an actual reasoning process of an agent demand for additional propositions to
simultaneously be possible, for example as prerequisite or as consequence. These propositions are the context in
which possibility is epistemically created by an agent. Modelling reasoning processes with Probabilistic Uncertainty
facilitates acknowledgement of implicit assumptions an agent holds by the notion of accepted truth. In a belief
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modelling experiment we would typically oﬀer an agent a number of propositions to choose the relevant propositions
from, to limit the scope of related and relevant propositions to a few of particular interest in the experiment. But
the mechanism by which the agent accepts propositions to be true, forming the meta-epistemic context. In essence
a met-epistemic context concerns the relevance of a context proposition for the meaning of a proposition under
evaluation.
Increasing the transparency of implicit assumptions through explicit context acceptance is of independent epis-
temic relevance because it allows the re-assessment of accepted propositions and the reduction of default truth
assignments based on habit, previous experiences, peer example, etc. We take this feature to respond to the criti-
cism by Chow, cited above: the approach [of Hoﬀmaster and Hooker] encourages an agent to complement explicitly
conscious experience with adjacent beliefs held, and fosters considering underlying (generally nonconscious) psycho-
logical processes in form of mutual bearing on the strength of belief. The conscious choice of propositions accepted
to be true by an agent for a given belief evaluation may alleviate biases in reasoning as for example prejudice,
cultural biases, or underlying psychological processes by rendering them transparent as explicit acceptance.
A truth assignment in our understanding reﬂects a (veriﬁable) state of the world external to the agent and a
reasoning result of an strictly internal highly individual reasoning process. The assignment of an agent's certainty
that something is possible calls on an evaluation in terms of both internal and external reasoning what is emphasized
by the term accepted truth and modelled as belief simpliciter. The evaluation of uncertain belief is the consequent
reasoning process reﬂecting the accepted propositions' capacity to represent an evaluation criterion. The following
two sections discuss in more detail how we interpret the two kinds of belief in the quantitative framework of
Probabilism.
3.1.1 Interpretation of Accepted Truth and Uncertain Belief in Quantitative Modelling
A belief modelling framework for non-ideal agency, in particular human agency, inevitably faces the challenge
of representing human psychological eﬀects, as for example selective attention or context-dependency. We take
selective attention to be a natural feature of a human mind that, according to some preferential or repellent mode,
restricts the possibility of perception by targeted attention. When modelling beliefs with Probabilistic Uncertainty
this eﬀect is relevant because it impacts the choice of propositions potentially considered possible. This in turn
aﬀects the evaluation of uncertain belief, as the probability and uncertainty assigned to a proposition are evaluated
based on context propositions considered possible.
A subset of propositions, named an epistemic state or a possible world, of all propositions the agent disposes of,
named the sample space, is called a reference class. A probability assignment in a reference class is a belief evaluation
of an epistemic state of an agent. The phenomenon that a proposition can be assigned diﬀerent probabilities within
the axiomatic framework of probability theory, given a diﬀerent subset of the sample space, i.e. a diﬀerent reference
class, is called the reference class problem Reichenbach (1971), Hájek (2007). In the context of Probabilistic
Uncertainty this means that uncertain belief in a proposition p (or propositional formula α, expressed as probability
and uncertainty, may be held with a diﬀerent strength, given a diﬀerent epistemic state (possible world).
3.1.2 Uncertain Belief as Probability Assignment
The reference class problem, i.e. the relativity of any probability w.r.t. the reference class (i.e. the accepted
truths), becomes a tool to enhance awareness if one refrains from viewing belief as a decision problem. Recognising
that the strength of (uncertain) belief, understood as the attitude of an agent w.r.t. a proposition (deﬁciently)
representing the actual world, is variable given diﬀerent contexts or evaluation criteria - by the agent's own lights -
is the aim of a belief evaluation in the awareness paradigm. The epistemic awareness that the (conscious) choice of
accepted possibilities provides the agent's reasoning grounds is expected to foster a kind of doxastic humility what
potentially has far reaching practical consequences in social interaction, decision practices, and self-understanding.
The translation of the meta language to the object language is, in our view, possible because the probability
assignment understood as representation quality - relative to a reference class - assures that the mapping of the
model to the object language respects the agent's individual understanding and relevance of relations and properties
in the epistemic context. That translation corresponds to a bridge principle as understood by Allo. He writes:
Bridge-principles do not simply relate claims about logical necessity and possibility (or validity) to
claims about what one should or should not believe, but in fact relate formal claims about validity
to informal claims about deontic statements about beliefs. Bridge-principles are, therefore, not just
connections between alethic modalities and some combination of deontic and doxastic modalities, but
also between formal and natural-language modalities.
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In that sense the (below in more detail discussed) modal operator B ∼ ﬁgures as a bridge between the modelling
of a human reasoner's self-understanding and concept understanding, expressed in natural language. The formal
claims about validity are vindicated by the axioms of probability. The deontic statements about beliefs embedded in
B ∼ are vested in the informal claims resulting from the deﬁnition of rationality which employs the epistemic norm of
truth on both strictly internal and external reasoning processes. The legitimacy of translation becomes particularly
important when epistemic contexts are constructed or inference rules are applied to propositions accepted by the
agent in the logical framework discussed below.
The notion of uncertain belief as gradual belief in terms of probability and uncertainty is interpreted as a
complete description of credences, because uncertainty deﬁned as the Kolmogorovian probability of all alternative
events the agent considers possible is based on the theorem of total probability, cf. Suppes (2000). That is, for a
proposition p the uncertainty is deﬁned from the probability, as Ψ(p) = 1− P (p).
Complete descriptions in form of two-dimensional approaches are discussed in literature for example Dubois and
Prade (2012), and advocated to be beneﬁciary for example by van Horn (2003) who cites Shafer15 Shafer (1976,
p.42):
One's beliefs about a proposition A are not fully described by one's degree of belief Bel(A), for Bel(A)
does not reveal to what extent one doubts A  i.e., to what extent one believes its negation A. A fuller
description consists of the degree of belief Bel(A) together with the degree of doubt Dou(A)=Bel(¬A)
Probabilistic uncertainty provides such a double perspective. The psychological eﬀect of assigning both proba-
bility and uncertainty to a proposition p is a kind of accuracy evaluation based on consistency. That is, given the
total probability of 1, the agent can reconsider her/his credence assignment to mutually exclusive propositions by
changing the perspective to the alternatives which are implicitly assigned strength of belief from the deﬁnition
of uncertainty. If the uncertainty assigned to one proposition accurately captures the strength of belief the agent
rationally holds for the alternatives, we say a balanced strength of belief and uncertainty is assigned.
For example, in a single proposition case the alternative to a proposition is its negation. In a multi-proposition
case a probability and uncertainty assignment implies that gradual belief in all alternative propositions must not
exceed the uncertainty assigned to the proposition in question.
In our view the criticism of Hájek underestimates the power compliance to the axioms of probability theory
together with a deﬁnition of rationality as sincere and truthful probability assignment has, in terms of rationality.
The (ridiculous) subjective probability assignment of 0.999 to p8: George Bush turns into a prairie dog, is licensed
provided that you assign 0.001 to this not being the case (and that your other assignments also obey the probability
calculus). If only p8 as single proposition is evaluated, the uncertainty of the agent is equivalent to her/his strength
of uncertain belief in ¬p8, that is, her strength of belief that p8 is not the case, by P (¬p8) = 0.001 = Ψ(p8) = 0.001.
If the agent rationally introspects her/his uncertainty about p8, what is equivalent to her/his belief in ¬p8, she/he
might re-adjust her probability assignment to p8 until P (p8) and Ψ(p8) reﬂect her/his sincere and truthful uncertain
belief in p8 and ¬p8. From the perspective of belief in ¬p8 it might prove for the agent that relevant context is
missing. This may lead to an adjustment of uncertain belief in p8 or, if accepted possibilities are introduced as
context, the agent's ridiculous beliefs might become understandable inter-subjectively.
In the single proposition case uncertain belief is a consistent notion for belief w.r.t. the axioms of probability.
In comparison to Dempster-Shafer belief functions, uncertain belief is a belief function solely for probabilistic events
in the spirit of Shafer (1976).
3.1.3 Accepted Truth as binary Probability Assignment
Accepted truths, i.e. propositions believed to be possible with a subjective probability of 1, are interpreted as
subjective probability assignments. That is, accepted propositions are self-suﬃcient and selected by choice. They
emerge from a sovereign, unrestricted, unprovable, subjective choice. Accepted truths16 are the expression of the
agent which propositions she/he is willing to include in her/his assessment, forming the context that conforms most
to the agent's intention in a belief evaluation. Accepted truths are belief simpliciter.
An accepted truth is conceived of as sovereign because it need not be justiﬁed, explained or referential. It can,
but it need not. Accepted truth is considered to be unrestricted, that is, accepted truth can be viewed in relation to
15However, Shafer and Vovk (2005) detail in response to question 1 Continuity that it is unnecessary to study both PF(A) (interpreted
as measure of the degree to which we expect A to happen) and PF (interpreted as a measure of plausibility of A happening), because
they can be deﬁned in terms of the other.
16for convenience the correct notion a proposition p or propositional formula α accepted to be true, denoted by a binary probability
assignment of 1, with the intended meaning that 'p is considered possible in context E by the non-ideal agent' is shortened hereafter to
an accepted truth.
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other propositions (for example two agents can compare their accepted truths) but the acceptance is not conditional.
Accepted truth is a subjective probability assignment based on internal and/or external reasoning processes of a
human agent. Propositions accepted to be true are the basis for the evaluation of gradual commitment in form
of uncertain belief for an evaluation criterion, a rationality. To use Hájeks example again, the agent may choose
to accept George Bush turning into a prairie dog to be possible, provided the agent can with the same credence
disbelieve that this is impossible. Accepted truth is considered to be unprovable in general because it encodes
possibility not probability. It can be provable possible that is, the proposition occurred to be true in the past w.r.t.
the rationality of evaluation. If it is, uncertain belief can be evaluated in terms of relative frequency.
Establishing a ﬁrm commitment to a propositions' possibility, related to the evaluation of the propositions' moral,
economic, or occurrence rationality (to name just a few), aims at ensuring the relevance of propositions accepted to
be true, and makes uncertain belief meaningful to start with. The evaluation of a proposition's rationality requires
in our view acceptance that the proposition is possible for the agent, as an expression of subjective engagement
necessary to avoid rational mischief. The commitment captured in acceptance is all-or-nothing for a state of aﬀairs
in the actual world to be possible (given a rationality), modelled as a proposition representing that state of aﬀairs
to be true. For example, suppose the rationality we are interested in is a moral rationality, and the state of aﬀairs
in the actual world we are interested in is anthropogenic climate change, we might model p4: 'The earth's climate is
changed by human action'. An agent accepting p4 accredits the proposition a moral dimension in her understanding
which she/he can testify. In other words, the agent accepts that it is possible that p4 is morally good or bad. From
that we know that the evaluation of uncertain belief in p4 is relevant for the agent.
The evaluation of uncertain belief is based on the accepted propositions the agent chooses. This resonates with
Putnam's observation cited above that there is no notion of reasonableness at all without context.
And lastly, accepted truth is considered to be created by choice. It is a true statement of self-expression based
on an individuals' self-understanding in a given moment. The sovereign, unrestricted, unprovable choice of accepted
propositions allows the non-ideal agent to become aware what it means to hold a belief in a proposition, in terms of
accepted truth and uncertain belief in a given evaluation. That is, the agent defeasibly reasons about what she/he
considers possible and how strong she/he holds a belief, exploring what context propositions are relevant to her/him
and how the context propositions impact her/his gradual belief in these propositions, given an evaluation criterion.
4 The Logical Perspective
Non-ideal agency is of particular interest if theoretical frameworks are developed aiming at practical relevance. A
non-ideal agent is taken to be an agent with limited resources as for example memory capacity and computational
power, hence not a logically omnicsient agent. Finding a balance between empirical accuracy for sound single-case
modelling of an agent in a given belief evaluation and normative rigour to allow scalability seems to be a particularly
demanding task17.
Probabilistic Uncertainty is a framework that aspires to be empirically adequate for non-ideal agents and con-
comitantly not being short of logical coherence. The fundamental question one has to address to meet that aspiration
is how a human agent can be both logically consistent and limited.
We do not consider the ideas presented so far to be revolutionary. Indeed the grounding in literature and ongoing
scientiﬁc discussion shows that many of the intuitions we assemble in Probabilistic Uncertainty ﬁgure independently
in one context or another. And this is true for the logical modelling too.
In the following we adapt the original notions of the authors, however, we emphasize that all of the following is
developed and presented by the cited authors. None of this is our genuine work, in particular full recognition for
the conceptual development of the logics and the formal proofs is on the part of the authors cited.
We apply their work as a formal model of belief conceptualised as accepted truth and uncertain belief. We do
so encouraged by Banerjee and Dubois (2014, p. 652) [henceforth BD] statement that One of the merits of MEL
is to potentially oﬀer a logical grounding to uncertainty theories of incomplete information., and the statement of
Fagin and Halpern (1991, p.172) We hope that this characterization [the logic for reasoning about probabilities]
leads to better tools for reasoning about uncertainty.
17Allo (2016), for example, addresses that tension by allowing for exceptions (a view called sohpisticated revisionist) and the
consequentialist criticism that a defeasible principle must relate formal systems, philosophical notions, and sets of norms (a view called
critical sceptic).
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4.1 Expressing Accepted Truth in a Logic
In this section we discuss how our understanding of accepted truth can be modelled logically. As discussed above,
we consider accepting a proposition to be a sovereign, unrestricted choice. Modelled in a logic, sovereignty amounts
to a setting where the logic models epistemic states of an agent, rather than truth in congruence with observable
reality. Propositions ﬁguring as accepted truth are unrestricted, what means that the agent is not dependent on
a previous reasoning process to accept a proposition. However, it does not mean that within a belief evaluation
the agent may assign truth values independent of any axiomatic setting - syntactic consequences are governed by
logical axioms.
Accepted truth in the logical modelling need not be provable from a semantic point of view. That is, whether
the accepted propositions conform to actual states of the world is irrelevant. In this way we do not require the
agent to conform her/his credences to the chances (the principal principle). We will see how this is captured in
the meta-epistemic logic MEL in detail, by encapsulating propositional formulae referring to the actual world (and
merely assuming that all tautologies are believed).
A more subtle aspect of non-provability is that the perspective of the modeller is always imperfect. The per-
spective adopted for the logical modelling of accepted truth and uncertain belief is external to the agent. However,
there is no judgement, weighing, or dismissive conduct of the modeller w.r.t. the testimony of a modelled non-ideal
agent - a human. The agent's information is, in line with BD, considered to be incomplete if the agent does not
know whether the accepted proposition is true or not. The modeller's information is imperfect as accepted truth is
regarded unprovable. In other words, the modeller takes the testimony of the agent to be true and takes the risk of
both misinterpreting the agent and an agent's deceit, though generally sincere testimony is assumed.
Accepted truth ought to represent possibility. However, contrary to possibilistic logic, cf. Dubois and Prade
(2004), accepted truth is designed as a binary notion of belief: either the agent accepts a proposition to be possible
or not, given a rationality. The reason for possibility as belief simpliciter is that acceptance reﬂects the agent's
commitment as subjective choice.
Possibilistic logic in the (generally used) gradual modelling establishes a lower bound of necessity degrees that
forms, in contrast to probability assignments, the threshold above which the validity is maintained across inference
steps. On these grounds possibilistic logic reﬂects the idea that the concept possibility can be used for deductive
reasoning, as inconsistencies do not arise above the threshold. It is a measurement of a conclusion's validity by the
least possible proposition involved.
This is not what accepted truth ought to express. Possibility, conceived as unrestricted and sovereign should
not reﬂect partial inconsistency. Therefore accepted truth is modelled, in terms of possibilistic logic, by only
allowing a threshold of necessity degree 1. In a sense our understanding is comparable in that we assume that
validity is maintained, but not in a gradual sense. However, we do not feel that formulating our ideas purely
in possibilistic logic would reﬂect the purpose of possibilistic logic frameworks, which are in essence a way for
inconsistency modelling through weighs. In contrast, accepted truth ought to express a non-restricted commitment
of the agent to a possibility modelled as proposition p, not a gradual truth implying inconsistency. However,
uncertain belief is gradual. We prefer using conditional probabilities to model gradual belief to exploit the super-
additive characteristics of both accepted truth as binary truth bearing inner measure and uncertain belief as
the concomitant expected degree of belief and uncertainty testiﬁed as probability assignment or as inner measure
induced by a probability measure in the non-measurable case. Put plainly, we model that an agent can err in her/his
judgement that a proposition is true (possible), hence accepted truth, but given the agent considers a proposition
is true, she/he cannot err in her gradual belief in that proposition.
We follow closely the structure of the original presentation of MEL by BD, both to maintain traceability,
comparability, and to illustrate that their framework need not be contorted in order to express the ideas of accepted
truth and uncertain belief.
In particular, we employ the MEL logic developed by BD to logically capture the truth assignments to propo-
sitions by the agent. We emphasize that the unrestricted commitment of the agent, i.e. the binary probability
assignment, is only concerned with possibility.
MEL is a meta-epistemic logic where the agent is modelled from an external point of view. The accepted truth
modality T corresponds in MEL to the modality , it depicts what the non-ideal agent reports to have accepted.
The items the agent can accept are propositional formulae α, β, based on propositional variables p1, . . . , pn with
the connectives ¬, ∧ of a classical propositional logic PL forming L. If accepted, the unary modality T is added in
front of the propositional formulae which, with the connectives ¬, ∧, form a MEL-formula φ.
To reﬂect the subjective, sovereign, unrestricted nature of the accepted truth modality MEL is particularly
suitable because the logic encapsulates propositional formulae through association of that unary connective T ,
and derived from it B ∼ in front of all sentences in L forming the disjoint language LT . The agent possesses a set
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of accepted true propositional formulae, distinguished from propositions and propositional formulae referring to the
real world formally by adding the modal operator T , to be read as the agent asserts acceptance of this proposition
to be true. Note however, that we assume the agent accepts α that are valid by axiom N, but no elements of L
can be assorted with accepted truths.
The modality B ∼, uncertain belief, corresponds to the ♦ modality in MEL, and reads 'a PL-formula can be
believed uncertainly, B ∼, given the agent does not accept truth of the negation of the PL-formula'. B ∼ is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 5. B ∼ α := ¬T ¬α, where α ∈ LT .
Self-suﬃciency of accepted truth is translated for the modality T in MEL by the prohibition of modal operator
iteration. That is, the agent does not formally introspect her/his accepted truths and uncertain beliefs. The formal
modelling is as reported by the agent.
The axioms and inference rule in MEL by BD are, for any MEL-formula φ, ψ, µ,∈ LT and any PL-formula
α, β in L
(PL) (i) φ→ (ψ → φ)
(ii) (φ→ (ψ → µ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ µ))
(iii) (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → φ)
(K) T (α→ β)→ (T α→ T β)
(N) T α, whenever `PL α
(D) T α→ B ∼ α
RULE (MP) If φ, φ→ ψ then ψ.
(PL) are axioms of propositional logic. Axiom K expresses that if an agent accepts that a proposition is entailed
by another, it follows that if the former is accepted, then the latter is accepted. The N-axiom denotes that the
agent is expected to accept all tautologies.
We read this axiom as the relation of the radically subjective realm of belief and the inter-subjectively observable
(inter-subjective) reality. BD emphasize, that this relation is an axiom in MEL, not an inference rule because α
is not a member of the language LT . We could say the agent's accepted truths are oriented towards the actual
world as we expect α to be accepted if α is entailed by (PL).
Axiom D is the connection between accepted truth and uncertain belief. BD themselves clarify that it is the
counterpart of the numerical inequality between belief and plausibility functions, necessity and possibility measures.
We interpret the axiom as counterpart for accepted truth and uncertain belief as numerical inequalities in terms
of probability and uncertainty. Axiom D is taken by BD in a hierarchical way in terms of strength, i.e. asserting
acceptance of α is stronger than asserting uncertain belief in α. That reﬂects our intention of ﬁrm commitment for
acceptance, modelled as binary notion, that is, accepted truth is assigned a subjective probability of 1 compared to
uncertain belief that is assigned a probability of ≤ 1. However, we would like to broaden the interpretation of D in
the sense that accepting is a prerequisite for uncertainly believing. That interpretation is modelled in the deﬁnition
of uncertain belief, deﬁnition 5, which is based on a notion of acceptance.
In related work by Dubois, Fragier, and Prade in Dubois et al. (2004, p.24) point at important features of
accepted beliefs. They write
Usually, accepted beliefs are understood as propositions whose degrees of belief are high enough to
be considered as true, and they form a deductively closed set. [. . . ] The speciﬁc requirement for p to be
an accepted belief is that the agent is ready to infer from p in a classical sense, as if p were true.
We model the agent's commitment to infer from p as if it were true by the modality T denoting the strongest
subjective probability assignment, i.e. T α iﬀ P (α) = 1, or P (¬α) = 1.
The probability assignment is formally modelled by the Boolean function τ discussed in section 4.4. Accepted
truth is a binary probability assignment so that accepting a propositional formula implies not accepting the negation
of the propositional formula in question (what is equivalent to the deﬁnition of uncertain belief). However, for later
reference we note here, that accepting a proposition (or the negation of a proposition) in one context does not
mean that proposition is accepted (or its negation) in a diﬀerent context. Indeed this would not reﬂect that we are
interested in the changed meaning of a proposition in a diﬀerent context.
In comparison, Dubois et al. (2004, p.24) deﬁne accepted belief according to a conﬁdence relation, a relation
comparing propositions in terms of their relative credibility for an agent : a minimal requirement for a proposition
p to be a belief is that the agent believes p more than its negation. This is the weakest deﬁnition one may think
of.
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We consider demanding a strong commitment for acceptance appropriate, given the agent is considered to be
'ready to infer from p in a classical sense, as if p were true'. As we conceptualise acceptance as unrestricted sovereign
choice (even if it may be partially unconscious) we are not primarily interested in the relative credibility compared
to other propositions. In a sense our minimal requirement is that the agent can accept, for a number of propositions,
that the aﬀairs of the actual world the propositions represent for the agent are materially adequate (considered
possible) w.r.t. a rationality.
However, we are aware that agents may be reluctant to testify strong commitments in practice, given the agent
might know to (partially) derive her/his beliefs from semitransparent internal reasoning structures, incomplete
observation of actual phenomena, unreliable information sources, insincere testimony of others, biased perception
and attention, social norms, etc. To alleviate the agent's reticence, the strongest commitment (probability 1) is
used for the weakest concept (possibility) in terms of consequence, so that correctness judgements (right/wrong)
are avoided. The strong commitment to a possibility allows us to construct epistemic states with deductive closure
that hold uncertainty. To express the agent's uncertainty we need 1) a gradual notion distinct from possibility and
2) an evaluation criterion for the agents uncertainty. The former is the probability and uncertainty assignment as
credence function whereas the latter is the rationality we are interested in.
We believe that to be in the spirit of BD, as they write:
A set-function is typically used as a representation of uncertainty. In other words, a propositional
valuation of the modal language can be viewed as an uncertainty measure. In the case of MEL, we can
deﬁne exactly which kind of uncertainty measure is induced by valuations.
BD model uncertainty using a Boolean necessity measure of possibility theory developed by Zadeh (1979). We
employ a Boolean probability measure to model the binary probability assignment of accepted truth. As Dubois
and Prade (2015, p.31) clarify, possibility theory is an uncertainty theory concerned with the modelling of incomplete
information. To a large extent, it is comparable to probability theory because it is based on set-functions. It diﬀers
from the latter by the use of a pair of dual set functions (possibility and necessity measures) instead of only one.
Besides, it is not additive and makes sense on ordinal structures. In the case of uncertainty understood as in
deﬁnition 2 above, the set function is also dual. By property (3) of the σ-algebra, noted in the deﬁnition's footnote,
it is assured that we can always ﬁnd the uncertainty corresponding to a probability assignment.
For accepted truth a binary probability is assigned, what corresponds to the necessity measure BD use. They
specify the necessity measure for the Boolean ﬁnite case:
A set-function N with range on the unit interval is a necessity measure in possibility theory provided that
N (∅) = 0, N (V) = 1, N (A ∩ B) = min(N (A),N (B)). It is a special case of belief function and lower
probability measure. In our modelling, it is the corresponding Boolean inner measure induced by a probability
measure, discussed in section 4.4.
4.2 Propositional and Epistemic Semantics
The modelling separates two levels. On the one hand the language L refers to the actual world, on the other
hand, the language LT encapsulates members of L and refers to the agents independent choice of what is accepted
to be true, related by axiom N to what the agent considers materially adequate in the actual world.
The atomic propositions p1, p2, . . . and the propositional formulae constructed from the atomic propositions
α, β, . . . of L, are the representation of states of aﬀairs in the actual world. We call a PL-formula α a 'minimal
context'. Valuations of atomic propositions reﬂect material adequacy in the agent's understanding.
Let a propositional valuation be a map w : PV → {0, 1}, where PV := p1, ..., pn. The set of all propositional
valuations (interpretations) is denoted by the ﬁnite set V. For a PL-formula α, w  α indicates that w satisﬁes
α or w is a model of α, i.e. w(α) = 1 (true), what reads 'the agents considers α to be possible', that is, α is a
representation of a state of aﬀairs that can represent a rationality for the agent. The set of all valuations that
model α is denoted by [α].
The second level epistemic semantics is based on standard propositional semantics for the propositional language
LT . A minimal context α that is accepted to be true by an agent, is assigned the unary modality T , forming the
MEL-atoms T α and MEL-formulae φ, ψ in LT . A propositional model of a MEL-formula is an interpretation v of
LT . A MEL-formula is satisﬁed if an interpretation, i.e. mapping form MEL-atoms to {0, 1}, makes a MEL-formula
true. If a MEL-formula φ ∈ LT is satisﬁed in all epistemic states, it is called a valid MEL-formula by BD.
An epistemic state E is represented by a subset of mutually exclusive propositional valuations. Each valuation
in V models a possible world. T α is said to be true if in all possible worlds compatible with what the agent believes,
it is the case that α, denoted by [α] as the set of valuations modelling18 α in correspondence with BD p. 640.
18That is {w : w  α}
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The satisfaction of a MEL-formula is deﬁned recursively. For any α ∈ L, and φ, ψ ∈ LT , for a non-empty
epistemic state E ⊆ V, a MEL formula is satisﬁed given.
E  T α iﬀ E ⊆ [α]
E  ¬φ iﬀ E 2 φ
E  φ ∧ ψ iﬀ E  φ and E  ψ
E is an epistemic state of subsets of valuations V, such that α is accepted by the agent if α is modelled in E. If
E  φ, E is called an epistemic model of φ, and if E  φ, φ ∈ LT , for all E, φ is said to be a valid MEL-formula.
Deﬁnition 6. An agent is said to be inconsistent if E = ∅. The assumption is that agents are consistent, so
generally it is assumed that E 6= ∅. This, together with deﬁnition 5 for uncertain belief gives rise to
E  B ∼ α if and only if E⋂ [α] 6= ∅.
Epistemic contexts can be constructed from an agent's testimony by the epistemic semantics for consequence
and equivalence. Semantic equivalence, denoted by ≡, and semantic consequence, denoted by MEL are notions to
relate formulae. Two formulae φ and ψ are semantically equivalent, if for any epistemic state E, E satisﬁes φ if and
only if E satisﬁes ψ, i.e. E  φ iﬀ E  ψ.
Semantic entailment for a set Γ of MEL formulae φ is based on the satisfaction of all members of Γ in an
epistemic state E, i.e. E  Γ means E  φ for each φ ∈ Γ. The epistemic models of Γ, denoted by [Γ], are the set
of epistemic states {E : E  Γ}. Then, for any set Γ ∪ {φ} of MEL-formulae, φ is a semantic consequence of Γ,
Γ MEL φ provided that for every epistemic state E, φ is satisﬁed if Γ is satisﬁed, i.e. E |= Γ implies E |= φ.
In other words, φ is a semantic consequence if Γ is satisﬁed in an epistemic state. Basing semantic consequence
on all epistemic models of Γ asseverates monotonicity and captures Davies and Brachman's observation of metalevel
monotonicity of probability theory.
By deﬁnition 6 it is assured that there is at least one possible world where α is accepted by the agent to be
possible. As a consequence, the epistemic state E of the agent is known to be consistent with [α] p. 643 BD.
Furthermore we thereby formally capture the requirement that accepted truths be relevant. If the agent does not
assign uncertain belief in any epistemic state, that is, the agent suspends judgement in every epistemic state (called
full ignorance by BD) then E
⋂
[α] 6= ∅ and the complement set of valuations is also consistent E⋂ [α]C 6= ∅.
The quantitative modelling of uncertain belief allows nonetheless to evaluate B ∼ quantitatively in terms of
the inner and outer measure across possible worlds and epistemic states. Indeed we think that screening diﬀerent
contexts is a common reasoning strategy of human agents to get one's bearings, if the strength of belief and
uncertainty in a proposition is diﬃcult to ﬁnd, for example because it is an unprecedented context, or an experience
(or awareness) has fundamentally changed the agents' attitude. A comparative reasoning strategy is calling upon
uncertain belief in the proposition in diﬀerent contexts as benchmarks or orientation, and from that knowledge
the agent is extrapolating to the context under evaluation. That extrapolation is possible by adjustment of the
strength of belief and uncertainty for the context of evaluation taking into account the (mutual) inﬂuences of
additional (missing) accepted truths as premises. Modelling such reasoning in terms of the inner and the outer
measure can assist or even encourage the agent to testify uncertain belief explicitly, using a bound of uncertainty
derived from diﬀerent contexts as suggestion. The lower bound of uncertainty is the highest assigned probability in
any subset of V 6= ∅ (all other assignments have a lower probability and hence a higher uncertainty).
For T α ∨ T ¬α the intended meaning by BD is the agent knows whether α is true or not, but her belief about
α remains unknown. We interpret that statement precisely in the sense of BD and consider it as an expression of
the subjective nature of belief expressed as T and B ∼. The authors draw attention to the fact that the language
allows expressing an agent's omission of a truth assignment on the part of the agent, but it cannot express that
we ignore if the agent knows anything about α.
We interpret that feature as non-judgemental, sincere, and uninvolved reporting of a an agent's testimony on
the part of the modeller. This may be in general be an assumption in agency and logical modelling, however,
MEL cannot express judgement of the modeller, just as it does not allow modelling introspective reasoning of the
agent. In other words, the models of a given evaluation reﬂect belief as it is, according to the agent's testimony.
Neither does the modeller modify the agents' assertions in additional external modalities expressing the modeller's
interpretation of what the agent reports, nor can the agent can express second thought on assertions what would
be modelled by iterating the modalities T and B ∼. The testimony is represented ipso facto what is considered to
be an expression of respect, sovereignty, sobriety, and trust.
In the following section we take a closer look at the modelling of uncertain belief in MEL and the Logic
for Reasoning about Probabilities by FHM to fully exploit the quantitative properties of the gradual credence
assignments denoting uncertain belief.
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4.3 Expressing Uncertain Belief in a Logic
The probability assignments are not considered to be truth conductive in a semantic interpretation of the logic.
What uncertain belief provides is an assessment of the agent's gradual commitment that a proposition accepted
to be possible represents the agent's understanding of the actual world and the rationality to be evaluated. B ∼
models gradual representation quality of a proposition salva veritate. In other words, the truth value is preserved
for the two co-referring modalities T and B ∼.
The statement B ∼ α ∈ Γ interpreted by BD as possible truth, in the sense that the agent has no argument
to the falsity of α. The agent either believes α or ignores whether α is true or not, cf. p.641. We, in close
correspondence interpret that statement in terms of uncertain belief as gradual belief expressed by the probability
and uncertainty assignments, based on the accepted truth of α. The agent is considered to have no argument that
it is impossible that α represents the rationality. The agent either considers α to be a (gradual) representation for
her/him or has not (yet) evaluated her internal and external subjective belief in α.
For B ∼ α∧B ∼ ¬α ∈ Γ the intended meaning by BD is the agent explicitly ignores whether α is true or not.
We interpret that statement as suspended judgement.
As Davis and Brachman (2014, p.101) clarify, classical probabilities can be considered as a monotonic theory,
however, this is only true on the metalevel. They say on p. 101 the statement Given a set of sentences Γ, φ
has probability x does not change its truth. [ . . . ] At the object level, probability theory is nonmonotonic. The
statement φ may become more or less likely as increasing evidence is accumulated.
This corresponds to our modelling: the metalevel is modelled in a monotonic setting of MEL, while the assessment
of propositions reasoned about in an epistemic state is governed by probability assignments that may be more or
less uncertain in diﬀerent minimal contexts and epistemic states, and are, if nonmeasurable sets are involved, in
general non-additive.
Nonmeasurable sets are formulae involving propositions the agent does not assign a probability to. In that case
the uncertain belief cannot be modelled by adding the probabilities assigned to atomic propositions. Instead, the
inner measure PF(α) induced by the probability measure is used to model a bound : the interval probability derived
from the powerset presented in deﬁnition 3. Inner measures correspond in a precise sense (FHM) to Dempster-
Sharfer belief functions. Both, belief functions and inner measures are generally non-additive, that is, the sum of
belief functions need not add up to 1. In literature non-additive measures are characterized by a condition called
total monotonicity, for example by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994, p.44).
Total monotonicity as deﬁned by Gilboa and Schmeidler refers a property19 of a function. The inner and the
outer measure induced by the probability measure are such functions deﬁned from a ﬁnite algebra on V from the
power set 2V on R, P2V → R is called a non-additive measure, if it is nonnegative and for every p1, . . . , pn ∈ 2V the
generalized Bonferroni inequality holds P (
⋃n
i=1 pi) ≥
∑
{I|φ6=I⊆{I,...,n}}(−1)|I|+1P (
⋂
i∈I pi).
Using this inequality we can compute the uncertain belief for every propositional formula accepted to be possible
from both directions, using the assigned probability or the concomitant uncertainty. That may be of particular
interest if an epistemic state is modelled involving propositions in formulae the agent suspends judgement on, but
chose to testify in other minimal contexts. These other contexts can be consulted to bound the uncertain belief.
BD interpret uncertain belief B ∼ generally as partial ignorance. Through the combination with the logical
framework of FHM we can quantify that partial ignorance in terms of probability and uncertainty across contexts.
The lower bound of uncertainty reads 'For the agent, the uncertainty of believing α is x or higher, that is, a
lower bound of uncertainty x is an interval probability on [0, 1] with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The highest assigned probability
is the strongest uncertain belief B ∼, testiﬁed in α in a context E ⊆ V that satisﬁes α maximally, E(6= ∅) ∈ V 
maxB ∼ α, given by P (α) = x with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Equivalently, the lowest assigned uncertainty in α can provide
orientation for an explicit assignment of uncertain belief, i.e. maxB ∼ α, given by Ψ(α) = y. Regarding the strength
of belief in B ∼ can be replaced by regarding the uncertainty deﬁned as Ψ(α) = 1 − P (α) = P (αC). To shift the
focus, the relation of the inner measure PF and the outer measure PF is used, given by PF(α) = 1− PF(αC). In
section 4.8 the perspective on uncertain belief for the two modelling levels is discussed, that is, the level of minimal
contexts contained in L referring to the actual world, and the epistemic level of an agent contained in LT where
truth of minimal contexts is accepted.
To quantitatively model B ∼ we use the axiomatic framework developed by FHM. Again we follow closely the
presentation of FHM in Fagin and Halpern (1991) and Fagin et al. (1990), however, with adapted notation.
Let a probability structure be a tuple (V,F , P, pi), where (V, E , P ) is a probability space, and pi is Boolean set
function associating with each w ∈ V a truth assignment pi(w) : L → {true, false}. It is said that α is true at w
if pi(w)(α) = true, otherwise it is said that α is false at w. FHM think of V as consisting of possible states of
19Observe that additive measures are totally monotone, totally monotone measures are convex and convex ones are superadditive,
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1994, p. 47)
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the world, where each state w in V can be associated a unique atom describing the truth values of the primitive
propositions in α. The diﬀerent states of a possible world come from the fact that diﬀerent combinations of
propositional valuations, i.e. multiple w, can satisfy propositional formulae characterising a possible world. FHM
provide the following example. If L = {p1, p2}, and if pi(w)(p1) = true and pi(w)(p2) = false, then the atom
p1 ∧ ¬p2 is associated with w. The same atom can have diﬀerent states associated or some atoms may not be
associated with any state.
Any formula α can be assigned a truth value using the rules of propositional logic for a probability structure
M , consisting of all states in M where α is true, i.e. {w ∈ V|pi(w)(α) = true}. If every primitive proposition p is
measurable (i.e. is assigned a probability) then every formula α is also measurable, and such an M is a measurable
probability structure. In the following section a bottom-up modelling approach is exempliﬁed where this feature
is used to model an expectation of uncertain belief arising from probability and uncertainty assignments to all
primitive propositions, provided the minimal contexts are accepted to be true.
For measurable probability structures the axioms and inference rules for propositional reasoning to Reason about
Probabilities are given by FHM p. 168. For every α and β that are propositional formulae of L.
TAUT (all instances of) propositional tautologies
RULE (MP) If α, α→ β then β
(W1) (nonnegativity) P (α) ≥ 0
(W2) (probability of event true is 1) P (true) = 1
(W3) (additivity) P (α ∧ β) + P (α ∧ ¬β) = P (α)
(W4) (distributivity) P (α) = P (β) if α⇔ β
is a propositional tautology.
Ameasurable probability structure requires the agent to assign a probability and uncertainty to every proposition
what may not be desired or possible. Moreover, modelling the expected uncertain belief in propositional formulae
as the additive combination of assigned probabilities is a monotonic setting.
For arbitrary probability structures, where the inner measure induced by the probability measure is used to
quantify uncertain belief, axiom W3 no longer holds, since inner measures are not ﬁnitely additive. For inner
measures P  is replaced by PF in the axioms W1,W2,W4, and W3 is replaced by
(W5) (probability of event
false is 0) PF(false) = 0
(W6) (total monotonicity) PF(α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αk) ≥∑
I⊆{1,...,k},I 6=∅(−1)|I|+1PF(∧i∈I αi).
Using the inner measure allows us to model non-monotonic reasoning. Note, that for explicit uncertainty
assignments PF(α) = PF(α) = P (α). The axioms (I1 - I6) an are not in detail repeated here. (I1-I6) are used
to compute the inner measure of Boolean combinations of propositional weight formulae a1w(αk), where a are
integers with k ≥ 1, w denotes the inner (outer) measure induced by a probability measure, and α1, . . . , αk are
propositional formulae . They are the standard assumptions for the handling of linear inequalities, namely (I1)
adding and deleting 0 terms, (I2) permutation, (I3) addition of coeﬃcients, (I4) multiplication and division by
nonzero coeﬃcients, (I5) dichotomy, and (I6) monotonicity, shown to be the sound and complete axiomatization for
Boolean combinations of linear inequalities, where w(αi) is treated like a variable xi.
We draw now attention to tautologies in the frameworks of BD and FHM, in particular in their respective
primitive propositions. In the MEL framework T α ∨ T ¬α, and generally T α ∨ T β, is not tautological because
epistemic models of a disjunction form the set {E : E ⊆ [α]}∪ {E : E ⊆ [β]}. In contrast, T (α∨β) would allow for
epistemic states where none of α or β can be asserted.
In particular, E  B ∼ α∧B ∼ ¬α is interpreted by BD as full ignorance, and we, as mentioned above, interpret
it as suspended judgement. This feature of possibility reasoning is well known in literature, and it does not impact
our requirement of acceptance to be non-contradictory. This has already been acknowledged in literature, for
example Dubois and Prade (2001, p.38) clarify the proposition possible p is not the same as p, and possible ¬p
is not the negation of possible p. Hence the fact that the proposition possible p and possible ¬p may be true
does not question the law of non-contradiction. We model the diﬀerence between possible p and p with the unary
modality T (and B ∼). In that reading p corresponds to the modelling level referring to the actual world contained
in L whereas possible p corresponds to the epistemic modelling level contained in LT where the modal operators
apply.
In the FHM framework, if p is a primitive proposition, p∨¬p it is not an instance of a tautology, since it is not
a weight formula, cf. Fagin et al. (1990, 85).
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It is interesting to remark that FHM, by Theorem 5.5, show that the complexity of deciding whether a weight
formula is satisﬁable with respect to probability structures is NP-complete and in a precise sense exactly as
diﬃcult as propositional reasoning. We consider this to be relevant not only for us as modellers, but also for
reasoners. An agent who is assumed capable of performing propositional reasoning, can be assumed (and can
consider herself/himself) capable of gradual belief reasoning for propositional formulae.
4.4 Relating the Logical Frameworks of BD and FHM
Of course, BD are aware of the enormous potential of MEL. They present MEL as a basis for reasoning about
uncertainty in the light of various formal approaches, including Nilsson's probabilistic logic (which is concerned
with measurable probability spaces) and FHM (which is more general, accounting in addition for nonmeasurable
events), when they say such logics can be studied as graded extensions of (fragments of) MEL.
The connecting constituent of BD's framework, FHM's framework and Probabilistic Uncertainty is the Boolean
set function. BD employ a Boolean necessity measure N , FHM use the Boolean set function pi, and Probabilistic
Uncertainty employs a Boolean inner measure τ induced by a probability measure.
We ﬁrst note that all functions are deﬁned on 2V with the Boolean set {0, 1} as their codomain. Our aim is to
see that the Boolean function τ : 2V → {0, 1} is equivalent to N .
Let τ : 2V → {0, 1} be an inner measure, as presented in deﬁnition 3, that is, τ(α) = max{P (w)|w ⊆ α and w ∈
V}. For propositional valuations v of LT (a mapping of MEL-atoms to {0, 1}) it is assured that the MEL axioms
hold for epistemic states A,B,E ⊆ V, if τ is a necessity measure by proposition 1 of BD. We then use τ to replace
pi in the framework of FHM, so that the truth assignments are respectful of the MEL axioms. The quantitative
probability and uncertainty assignments in any epistemic state A,B,E are then interpreted as the quantitative
counterpart to B ∼ embedded in the weaker (possibilistic) binary truth assignments of τ interpreted as accepted
possibilities.
In the Boolean ﬁnite case for each such necessity measure N there exists a unique non-empty subset E ⊆ V,
N (A) =
{
1 if E ⊆ A
0 otherwise.
N (A) = 1 corresponds to the epistemic semantics of assertion T α, where [α] = A. The epistemic state E can
be deﬁned from propositional valuations of L (in contrast to v), w ∈ E if and only if N (V\{w}). By proposition 2
of BD, a Boolean necessity measure N on 2V , with a valuation v deﬁned by v(T α) := N ([α]) for all α ∈ L, satisﬁes
all instances of axioms K, N, D. By remark 2 p. 644 we are explicitly assured that this is also true for the Boolean
function τ when BD write
Proposition 2 holds for Boolean versions of more general set-function than necessity measures,
namely, super-additive ones, i.e., such that τ(A ∪ B) ≥ τ(A) + τ(B) whenever A ∩ B = ∅, since if the
range of τ is the set {0, 1}, then the super-additivity axioms is equivalent to τ(A∩B) = min(τ(A), τ(B))
for all A,B ⊆ V.
We draw attention to the multivalued case of necessity measures, that (sort of) corresponds to the quantitative
notion of uncertain belief, where axiom K is stronger than the bivalent axiom of necessity measures we employ for
accepted truth. Our intention that accepting a proposition as true possibility is a prerequisite for believing that
proposition uncertainly in the range of [0, 1], is here captured in the formal modelling, as the numerical inequality
τ(AC ∪B) ≤ max(1− τ(A), τ(B)) enforces τ to be a Boolean set-function20 p. 644 BD.
For uncertain belief, let τ range on [0, 1] expressing axiom K using N as the numerical inequality min(τ(AC ∪
B), τ(A)) 6 τ(A ∩ B) which is equivalent to the axiom of necessity measures in the gradual case. However,
we only exploit the quantitative representation and do not value the probability and uncertainty assignments as
truth assignments, so that Probabilistic Uncertainty is not a multi-valued framework. The point is to reason about
probabilities, in correspondence with Fagin et al. (1990) p. 79:
We expect our logic to be used for reasoning about probabilities. All formulas are either true or
false. They do not have probabilistic truth values.
We adopt FHM's semantics presented in detail in Fagin et al. (1990). Let the probability structureM be the tuple
(V,F , P, pi), so that pi associates a truth assignment (a valuation) w in V to the primitive propositions p in L. Deﬁne
20Illustrated by assuming τ on the range of [0, 1] and assuming A = B, then max(1− τ(A), τ(A)) ≥ 1
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pM = {w ∈ V|pi(w)(p) = true}. If the set pM is measurable for each primitive proposition p the probability struc-
ture M is called measurable. The set pM is interpreted as the minimal contexts. The truth assignment is extended
to all propositional formulas such that with each propositional formula α the set αM = {w ∈ V|pi(w)(α) = true}.
In the non-measurable case the inner measure induced by the probability measure replaces the probability measure
P . If the propositional formulae are accepted they are associated the unary modality T and become MEL-atoms
in LT . The semantics for B ∼ are then deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 7. M  a1B ∼ (α1) + · · ·+ akB ∼ (αk) ≥ c iﬀ a1PF(αM1 ) + · · ·+ akPF(αMk ) ≥ c
B ∼ α corresponds to a primitive weight term in FHM's notation, forming a weight term together with the
integers ak, where k ≥ 1. We will not make use of that terminology, however, it is important to unambiguously
relate our notation to the original authors' work. For simplicity we assume here a = 1. M satisﬁes B ∼ α ≥ c
iﬀ there is a measurable set contained in αM whose probability is at least c. If M is a measurable probability
structure, then PF(α) = PF(α) = P (α) for every formula α.
Using the integers ak for reasoning with inequalities allows modelling relative uncertain beliefs. FHM provide
the example B ∼ (α1) ≤ 2B ∼ (α2) what would read the uncertain belief in α1 is twice the uncertain belief in
α2. As such we can formally capture the qualitative dimensions - the rationalities - and their relative relevance
for an agent. Modelling the qualitative dimension of uncertain belief in the formal framework in detail must be
left to future work, so that we merely sketch the idea here. The basic idea is that the valuations are indexed to a
rationality and accordingly form subsets of valuations. If an agent agent can prioritize diﬀerent rationalities (e.g.
moral, economic, etc.) according to their relative relevance for the agent, these weighs can be introduced via the
integers of weight terms ak with k ≥ 121.
4.5 Modelling Variants
Generally, there are two levels of modelling. On the one hand, propositions referring to the actual world, p and
formulae α contained in L, on the other hand the meta-level is modelled with accepted propositional formulae T α,
called MEL-atoms and MEL-formulae φ contained in LT . Uncertain belief is modelled on the former level by P (p),
P (α), or, in case of interval probability assignments P(p), P(α) with associated uncertainty Ψ(p), Ψ(α), respectively
ψ(p), ψ(α). On the meta level uncertain belief is denoted by B ∼ for all assignments of gradual belief associated
with formulae in an epistemic state. Uncertainty is equivalent to uncertain belief in a diﬀerent epistemic state,
as epistemic states are subsets of mutually exclusive propositional interpretations. For interval probabilities it is
calculated using the conjugate U(w) = 1− L(¬w) respectively L(w) = 1− U(¬w) as given in section 3.
4.6 Bottom-Up Modelling
When modelling beliefs bottom-up in Probabilistic Uncertainty we start modelling from the propositions referring to
the real world and then construct epistemic states, the meta-level. The agent is asked to assign atomic propositions
p a probability and uncertainty in the single proposition case for a given rationality. On this level the axiomatic
setting of FHM is applied to construct propositional formulae in L. Given the agent testiﬁes to accept a propositional
formula in L, that propositional formula is assigned the modality T and forms an MEL-atom in LT . On the meta-
level epistemic states can be construed. If all truth values of atomic propositions p forming propositional formulae are
known so are the truth values of accepted MEL-atoms and the truth-values of the other MEL-atoms are determined
by axioms K, D, N. For interpretations of MEL-formulae (i.e. valuations v) satisfying axiom N (i.e. τV = 1), axiom
D (for all A ⊆ V, τ(A) ≤ 1− τ(AC)), and both K and N (for all A,B ⊆ V, τ(A ∩B) = min(τ(A), τ(B)), epistemic
states can be constructed. Such an epistemic state is deﬁned as Ev := {w ∈ V : τ(V\{w}) = 0}.
Using FHM's framework measurable propositional formulae can be evaluated, e.g. α = p1 ∧ p2, by asking
the agent to assign a probability and uncertainty to all atomic propositions p, for example, p1: 'Mary calls on
Saturdays', p2: 'Mary is on vacation'. The propositions referring to the 'real world' are captured in L, distinct from
LT , the set containing accepted propositions and propositional formulae according to the testiﬁed understanding of
the actual world. From that we can model epistemic states of the agent where an expectation of the agent's beliefs
can be formulated based on the testimony. However, we emphasize that assembling single proposition evaluations
21From the qualitative dimensions, even if L contains only one single proposition, a probability distribution can be created over
diﬀerent rationalities in which the agent testiﬁes. This in turn raises awareness for the context dependency of uncertain belief.
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to propositional formulae creates minimal contexts for a single proposition. The agent does not necessarily accept
the compound, though we assume she/he does given the testimony, what is captured in axiom N22.
In order to evaluate the empirical adequacy of the approach for that speciﬁc agent, the agent needs to accept
the compound propositional formula by testimony. If the agent explicitly accepts α = p1 ∧ p2 as PL-formula, we
are justiﬁed to assume that the modelling can be empirically adequate in this case. This is important because the
minimal context created by assembling atomic propositions to propositional formulae might impede acceptance.
For example, the agent may testify, for the evaluation criterion occurrence rationality, to rationally believe p1 and
p2 independently, but not accept that 'Mary is on vacation and calls on Saturdays', for instance because the agent
has implicit knowledge (maybe there is an agreement to send emails instead of calling when on vacation).
Bottom-up modelling should be tested for empirical adequacy of formulae to ensure the set LT holds accepted
truths of the particular agent in an actual belief evaluation situation. In a sense we abstract away from the agent's
assertions by forming propositional formulae, so that we can evaluate the empirical adequacy of acceptance for that
agent if we concretise back to actual statements of the agent (for the constructed contexts) by interrogation.
The construction of minimal contexts (i.e. propositional formulae) by the agent may diﬀer from an axiomatic
construction according to PL axioms. Also, the construction of MEL-formulae φ of accepted propositional formulae,
and the inference rules to construct synthetic consequences can lead to logically legitimate but, in a sense, unintuitive
contexts from the viewpoint of the agent.
As Chow states Chow (2016, p.7) it is empirically established that various processes inﬂuence our thought
and action, but escape introspection. A discrepancy between axiomatically rigorous construction and empirical
evidence by testimony is sometimes considered as inconsistent reasoning. It is the very reason why naturalistic
accounts to model reasoning emerged. However, we consider deviations from axiomatic compliance not per se
as irrational human behaviour but as direct proof of implicit beliefs. Also, intentional or unintentional rational
mischief could be involved caused, for example, by relations to entrenched beliefs the agent is unaware of. With
Probabilistic Uncertainty implicit assumptions, prejudices, unconscious biases, (un-)intentional rational mischief
can be investigated in the bottom-up modelling.
To that end, propositions p in an epistemic state are re-evaluated, reasoned about in a context by the agent,
and two questions are raised. 1) what propositions need to be accepted additionally or need to be removed in order
to maintain acceptance and the strength of belief and uncertainty the agent assigned in the single proposition case.
This question serves to identify interdependencies. 2) what is the uncertain belief in a proposition p given diﬀerent
minimal contexts in which p ﬁgures? This question serves to evaluate the quantitative variability of belief in p
for the agent. Probabilistic Uncertainty can be used to model both interrelations and quantitative uncertain belief
magnitudes. In a sense, we evaluate the relevance of the context by changing the context. The extreme contexts
are obviously the single proposition case and the universal conjunct of accepted propositions of a belief evaluation.
It is not obvious but important that the perspectives on strength of belief and uncertainty are fundamentally
diﬀerent on the level of primitive propositions in L and on the level of LT . In the former case the perspective is
on the strength of belief, while in the latter the perspective is on the uncertainty. This is so, because the inner
measure of atomic propositions p without testimony is 0, while the default inner measure of MEL-atoms is 1. In
an epistemic state E a valuation vE of an accepted propositional formula α is given by
vE(T α) :=
{
1 if E ⊆ [α]
0 otherwise.
This, together with E  B ∼ α if and only if E⋂ [α] 6= ∅ allows us to see that. In other words, once a
propositional formula is accepted to be true (is a member of LT ), uncertain belief emphasizes the uncertainty that
the propositional formula represents the agent's belief, implying that α is believed less uncertainly too. Uncertain
belief is deﬁned as 'not accept not α' and the uncertainty amounts to 'accept not α'. Consequently, uncertainty
allows us to model an expectation of strength of belief in a diﬀerent epistemic state, where the negation of α is
accepted.
The modal operator B ∼ does not exist23 for members of LT . The strength of belief and associated uncertainty
for elements of L are expressed as P (·) and Ψ(·). A probability assignment x to atomic propositions p emphasizes the
strength of belief implying that weaker beliefs in the same proposition are held too. A suspended judgement collapses
to complete uncertainty for propositions in L, whereas suspended judgement for propositions in LT collapses to
acceptance of the proposition with the corresponding uncertainty of the least upper bound (which must exist unless
the agent is inconsistent).
22(N) T α, whenever `PL α.
23In MEL, modalities  and  only apply to PL-formulae, contrary to usual modal logics. BD p. 641.
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That reﬂects the diﬀerence between reasoning about accepted propositions and reasoning about propositions
in general. We consider the single proposition assignments as tentative, indicating which propositional formulae
could be accepted by the agent and how uncertainly the agent might believe them. Based on the single proposition
assignments we have an expectation for the agent's uncertain belief in α, given by deﬁnition 3 PF(α) = sup{P (p)|p ⊆
α and p ∈ L}.
If the agent does testify uncertainty, the agent holds uncertain belief in the epistemic state E  B ∼ α∧B ∼ ¬α
then T α ∨ T ¬α. Generally, epistemic models of a disjunction form the set {E : E ⊆ [α]} ∪ {E : E ⊆ [β]}
reading that at least one is asserted by the agent. On the meta-epistemic level the agent testiﬁes to accept truth -
and the gradual belief models the uncertainty that the true proposition in a given context represents the agent's
understanding. Epistemic states restricted to singletons would mimic classical semantics and allow for epistemic
states where none of α or β can be asserted. This makes sense because for singletons the epistemic context is
equivalent to the modelling of propositions referring to the actual world, where suspending judgement leads to an
inner measure of 0.
4.7 Top-Down Modelling
Suppose we are interested in an agents' uncertain belief concerning the social aspects of a state of aﬀairs in the
actual world, that is, we are interested how strong a proposition p represents a social rationality for an agent. It is
known that agents tend to testify socially accepted beliefs in the single proposition case, in particular for social,
moral, and ethical evaluation criteria. A well known example is the not-in-my-backyard ﬂip of acceptance and
uncertain belief if contexts change, or the well-behaved assertion that gender equality is desirable but for female
employees in our company payment isn't that important (otherwise, they would negotiate better...). For social,
moral, and ethical dimensions context is extremely important.
In a top-down setting the agent is asked whether she/he accepts simpliciter propositional formulae α providing
a minimal context, and how strong the minimal contexts represent a rationality. Note that this allows for quite
complex belief evaluations.
For accepted minimal contexts that share individual constituents, an expectation for uncertain belief can be
evaluated across minimal contexts and for constructed epistemic contexts. We can assign an expected lower (upper)
bound of uncertainty in epistemic states where the agent accepts propositional formulae, disbelieves α, or suspends
judgement on α. Indeed BD provide in section 4.1 the proposition 5, clarifying that belief (plausibility) functions
are numerical generalizations of MEL formulae that can be evaluated top-down. They write:
There is a similarity between the problem of reconstructing a mass assignment m from the knowledge
of a belief function and the problem of representing an epistemic state E in the language of MEL given by
m(E) = P ([δE ]) = P
([
T αE ∧ ¬
∨
w∈E
T ¬αw
])
[where, in our notation δE := T αE ∧
∧
w∈E B ∼ αw] It is literally the probability P ({E}) of only
knowing E. [...] At the syntactic level, one could handle graded modal propositions rα where α is a
proposition in PL, and r ∈ [0, 1] stands for a lower bound for the degree of belief of α. At the semantic
level, the satisfaction relation should be of the form m  rα whenever
∑
E⊆[α]m(E) ≥ r. This is
clearly one of the perspective opened by our framework.
The uncertain belief operator B ∼ corresponds to rα. Adopting the semantic deﬁnition of FHM, deﬁnition 7,
then yields PF  B ∼ α whenever
∑
E⊆[α] PF(E) ≥ c.
Suppose LT contains the accepted PL-formulae T α, T β with a probability and uncertainty assignment for a
rationality, and T γ. Upon interrogation the agent ignores to testify on her/his uncertainty in γ. We can still reason
about the agent's uncertain belief in γ which is explicitly ignored if atomic propositions in γ ﬁgure in α or β. In
particular we can quantitatively assess an expected lower bound of uncertainty.
The inference rules in MEL (proposition 4 BD) apply to encapsulated PL-formulae. Testing logical implications
for empirical adequacy by interrogation might lay bare an agent's rational mischief and/or the empirical inade-
quateness of our modelling. The MEL inference rules, for propositional formulae α, β, γ, are (1) a weakened from
of PL modus ponens which preserves consistency, not certainty (hence not truth) of inner formulae. (2) a kind
of resolution rule of possibilistic logic which preserves the weakest degree of certainty. And (3) the resolution
counterpart of (1).
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(1) {T α,B ∼ (α→ β)} `MEL B ∼ β
(2) {T (¬α ∨ β), T (α ∨ γ)} `MEL T (β ∨ γ)
(3) {T (¬α ∨ β), B ∼ (α ∨ γ)} `MEL B ∼ (β ∨ γ)
Again, our expectation for construed contexts is compared to an agent's testimony for that context to evaluate
the empirical adequacy. Unless the agent conﬁrms our expectations, we can read the modal operator B ∼ uncertain
belief also as our uncertainty, as modellers, that we correctly capture the agent's strength of belief and uncertainty,
based on the contextual information the agent testiﬁed.
4.8 Hybrid Modelling
The hybrid modelling approach combines top-down and bottom-up to prudently construe contexts and identify
signiﬁcant propositions that impact the evaluation of compounds (propositional formulae and MEL formulae). We
emphasize that formally members of L cannot be assorted with members of LT . The hybrid modelling approach
can be used to investigate atomic propositions in L which might be ignored in minimal contexts and accepted
truths, for example if (un-)intentional rational mischief occurs. To investigate acceptance, (changed) meaning of a
proposition in context, and (changed) meaning of a context w.r.t. a proposition, the single-case and the compound
testimony is compared with our expectation as given by the MEL and FHM axioms.
To give an example, suppose the agent, in the course of a belief evaluation of an accepted propositional formula
T α = p1 ∧ p2 testiﬁes for an economic rationality to accept α and hold uncertainty Ψ(α) = 0.3. That is, using
the R-probability ﬁeld as speciﬁed in deﬁnition 3 where Ψ corresponds to a structure M the non-empty set of
Kolmogorovian probability functions Ψ = {P (·)|L(w) ≤ P (w) ≤ U(w)} for every w ∈ F hence Ψ(α) = [0, 0.3] for
every meta-epistemic context where α is accepted and testiﬁed.
We might be interested in the variability of uncertain belief in α in the light of a diﬀerent minimal context,
say including p3, for a given rationality. Suppose the agent testiﬁes to believe p3 is economical with a strength of
belief P (p3) = 0.6. Note, that we construct the belief/uncertainty probability interval from the other side: the
strength of belief without testiﬁed acceptance that p3 is economical. The agent herself/himself is uncommitted to
the possibility that p3 is economical, i.e. P (p3) = [0, 0.6].
We can then evaluate the contextual beliefs of both the propositional formula and the atomic proposition in
combination. Let β = p1 ∧ p2 ∧ p3, then the expectation for the strength of belief and uncertainty for β is given by
the the R-ﬁeld, limited by the highest uncertainty (that is Ψ(p3) = [0.4, 1] as L(0.4), U(1). We remark that if the
agent does not testify to accept β, the propositional formula is contained in L and is in case of suspended judgement
assumed to be not accepted. In other words, if an agent's acceptance is a formal consequence (by regarding T β as
consequence of individual acceptance of α and β where p3 ﬁgures), it is pure speculation.
The interval captures that if a belief of strength x with x = [0, 1] is testiﬁed for an accepted proposition, the
agent is considered to belief the proposition simpliciter. Uncertain belief denotes the agents conviction that her
judgement of a proposition being - for example economical - as accepted is uncertain. We could say it is the error
probability agents assign to their own judgement.
If the agent testiﬁes to accept β, then T β, and the modal operator reﬂects the expected interval of uncertainty.
The strength of belief corresponds to the F-Probability, the uncertainty to the resulting R-Probability. For the
example, given T β, we can model the agent's uncertain belief that β represents an economical state of aﬀairs
given accepted truth of β by B ∼ β = [0.6, 1] (acceptance, i.e. strongest belief, down to weakest belief), and an
uncertainty Ψ(β) = [0, 0.4] (acceptance, i.e. no uncertainty, up to highest uncertainty) with Ψ(p1) = 0.3,Ψ(p2) =
0.3,Ψ(p3) = 0.4. In non-technical terms the agent could say I accept that β is economic by a strength of at least
0.6, i.e. 0.6 or higher. Or, put yet diﬀerently, in at least 6 out of 10 situations where all statements about the real
world β represents for the agent are true, the situation turns out to be economic for the agent.
5 Some considerations on Belief Change
A human being is subject to perpetual change. With every second passing the human being has consciously or
subconsciously processed thoughts and beliefs, has undergone experiences and interacted with the environment as
for example studied in phenomenology. A human reasoner may, after even a short period of time, evaluate the
beliefs held in a proposition diﬀerently given the same set of accepted truths, i.e. B ∼ is unstable over time. Also,
the propositions a human reasoner considers relevant for the evaluation of beliefs for a given rationality may change
without obvious reason from an inter-subjective perspective, i.e. LT is unstable over time. That reasoning of human
agents is inﬂuenced by many internal and external stimuli is sometimes perceived as psychological bias, as ﬂaw of a
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human reasoner in contrast to, say, AI. Chow points at well known phenomena, explicitly mentioning the framing
eﬀect. The phenomenon of judging information in resonance with the way information is presented, unconsciously
or consciously biasing the judgement, is called the framing eﬀect, cf. Levin et al. (1998).
In Probabilistic Uncertainty both accepted truths and uncertain beliefs are not considered as (non-physical)
objects the human reasoner possesses, rather these notions refer to concepts the human reasoner creates ad hoc, for
a given intention serving the purpose of gaining awareness. The reasoner is not bound to the result of a previous
reasoning process.
Viewed from this perspective the reasoner does not change a belief, rather the human reasoner creates beliefs as
an active, immediate response to both, herself/himself and her/his environment. This is a fundamentally diﬀerent
perspective than many belief modelling frameworks adopt, for example the AGM theory with deductively closed
belief sets, or other approaches employing belief bases that are not necessarily deductively closed. In the same
line Bayesian belief change models typically depart from an (arbitrarily chosen) set of propositions and condition
the belief function according to evidence. Adopting the view that belief ought to be conditioned on evidence is
sometimes called the evidentialist view, such that the disposition to believe is in accordance with, or a function of,
evidence. In contrast one can view evidence as a virtue arising from an agent's disposition to believe, a view called
virtue epistemology, holding that agents are at the origin of epistemic values and hence the nature of cognition is
under scrutiny in that perspective Greco (1993).
That nature of cognition is typically discussed from the perspective of a moral, ethical, or value theory. An
overview of arguments in the contemporary debate by the most acknowledged researchers can be found in Fernández
Vargas (2016), Fairweather and Zagzebski (2001), Axtell et al. (2000).
Though it is our fundamental interest to relate our ideas to these accounts we postpone the taxonomy of
Probabilistic Uncertainty as we seek in this discussion to establish a thorough understanding of what our ideas
actually express given the modelling we propose. The foregone chapters aimed at providing a concrete form of
the modelling in terms of conceptual, quantitative and logical structure. Based on an understanding of what it
is we discuss what it means in future work to do justice to the complexity of the existing arguments in virtue
epistemology. It might well be that in the course of this process our modelling approach will change. In our
understanding that would be a natural process because the modelling implicitly reﬂects arguments of diﬀerent
schools of thought that may not be obvious prima facie. Our beliefs about what the modelling expresses are but one
perspective, and once the facts are inter-subjectively communicable, i.e. are given a linguistic, quantitative, and
logical form, the ideas can be regarded from diﬀerent perspectives and may prove to support or contradict various
arguments. However, we regard these (potential) changes not as a process of improvement, rather, we consider
our potentially arising change in views and modelling as structurally independent. In the same sense, we consider
the beliefs an agent testiﬁes in a belief evaluation as independent from new information and no learning in the
conventional meaning is modelled. A new belief evaluation is strictly independent of former testimony. We take a
repeated belief evaluation to be a timely distinct evaluation of beliefs expressed as linguistically similar propositions.
Generally, beliefs in our understanding are not held stronger by virtue of being repeatedly part of a reasoning
process, i.e. the relative frequency of a belief is considered to be a property of the reasoner, rather than a property
of the belief. In other words, the human reasoner may choose to repeatedly create a belief, or not. Equivalently, we
consider the connection, i.e. the relation, connotation, or intuitive plausibility of the relation of two propositions
not as stronger based on the re-creation of that connection in a new reasoning process.
Beliefs in our understanding are not held more true by virtue of being repeatedly part of a reasoning process.
The relative strength of belief is an instantaneous, direct assignment independent of former results of reasoning
processes (belief evaluations).
Beliefs in our understanding are not held exclusive in repeated reasoning processes. A reasoning process, as
conceived in this discussion, is composed of a reasoner who chooses to accept propositions to be true and evaluates the
strength of uncertain belief in (some of) the propositions for a given rationality. A proposition can, in the same set
of accepted propositions simultaneously be assigned diﬀerent strengths of uncertain belief for diﬀerent rationalities.
Each assignment is considered to be unique, reﬂecting the agent's understanding of the propositions in question
in the context, the rationality, and the in sito situation of the agent during the belief evaluation. Conceptualizing
beliefs as subjective, instantaneous expressions created by a human agent in response to (a naturally changed) Self
and environment embraces the paradigm that belief is an awareness problem, not a decision problem. The human
agent becomes by re-creation aware of what is believed in that moment.
Obviously, conceptualising beliefs as representations of an unique understanding based on ad hoc reasoning
processes expressed as structure (epistemic states) and rational strength of belief (the agent is assumed to genuinely
know), deﬁes generalisations of a single belief evaluation to a reasoners beliefs held. However, modelling beliefs
bottom-up, hybrid, and top-down creates contexts and expectations that can only be warranted if we assume gen-
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erality of the agent's testimony. We assume generality in order to justify our expectations based on the agent's
testimony and have the agent legitimate our expectations by repeated inquiry to evidentially support our under-
standing of her/him. We emphasize that an agent who is rational according to deﬁnition 1 may not conﬁrm our
expectation. Our understanding of the agent as modellers is limited to what has been testiﬁed and the assumption
of generality can be regarded as auxiliary assumption reﬂecting the modellers imperfect knowledge. The more the
agent testiﬁes, the more empirical adequacy can be reﬂected in the modelling - we could say we get to know the
agent better. But more importantly, as the modelling allows us expressing an expectation for the structure and
strength of beliefs of an agent, we might create logically consistent contexts the agent may not have been aware of -
we could say the agent gets to know herself/himself better when evaluating the empirical adequacy of our modelling.
What we want to investigate in future work is how our intuition that acceptance gives rise to belief unfolds in
MEL. Once a proposition is accepted by an agent, that is, once the agent testiﬁes that a proposition can represent
a rationality for her/him, we can by supposing that the proposition is false open a new epistemic state for which
we can formulate expectations using logical equivalence and the quantitative properties of strength of belief and
uncertainty by Ψ = P (AC).
Although the modelling can be read in that way, the non-ideal agent modelled is not considered to possess a
belief set or belief base to which a belief revision process could apply. The propositions in the sets L and LT are
considered as inter-subjective objects that are not attached to the agent. In a sense one could view the propositions
representing the actual world and forming epistemic states as place-holders, adopted for a period of time by the
agent to exercise - to express - a reasoning process. This adoption does not inﬂict any commitment to the agent to
accept and (uncertainly) believe a proposition in future belief evaluations or logically constructed contexts.
The reasoning process is ﬁnished when the purpose of a belief evaluation is met. The purpose is gaining
awareness. In contrast to, for example, the the AGM framework Alchourrón et al. (1985) operations as expansion,
contraction, and revision are meaningless, because the ad hoc belief base (the accepted truths) of a reasoning process
at a time t0 is not necessarily a representation of an ad hoc set of accepted truths at a time t1. That is, there is no
assumption of a stability property whatsoever adherent to the structure of reasoning in terms epistemic states and
possible worlds arising from accepted truth beyond the modelled reasoning process in question. Equivalently no
stability is assumed for the result of the reasoning process in terms of strength of belief and uncertainty. Quite on the
contrary, instead of belief reinforcement to create stability through evidential support, repeated belief evaluations
of the same beliefs are likely to increase the understanding of the variability of strength of belief and uncertainty.
By this conception the reasoning process is most compliant with the purpose, as more awareness is gained, if the
non-ideal agent re-creates, instead of adapts her/his believes. In particular, an agent who acquires information that
a belief held is false is modelled in Bayesian frameworks as conditionalisation on events of probability 0. Obviously
this is impossible in Kolmogorovian probability where conditional probabilities are deﬁned as ratio. Preempting
the problem by requiring that probability 0 be only assigned to impossible events amounts to stipulating that agents
never have any wrong beliefs, cf. Baltag and Smets (2008, p.182), and collapses belief into knowledge. In our
modelling the concept of accepted truth reﬂects that wrong beliefs are basically diﬀerent epistemic states an agent
may well reason about. This, in a sense hypothetical reasoning, may bear important information for beliefs accepted
to be true. The connection between these epistemic states is modelled as uncertainty deﬁned as the probability of
alternative events. In a sense the new information of having a false belief is contained in the modelling of a belief
evaluation for a given set of propositions.
Regarding belief evaluations as independent serves the purpose in the awareness paradigm. Again we emphasize
that belief conceived a such is not about believing right, but about recognizing (1) that one believes at all, and
(2) recognizing what is believed and the respective strength of belief and uncertainty in a given reasoning process.
In this sense, the human agent cannot reason unsuccessfully because success is not determined by inclusion or
withdrawal of sentences from a belief set. Instead success is determined by the fact that the agent acknowledges
her/his reasoning process in terms of structure, i.e. the epistemic states and states of possible worlds of a belief
evaluation, and result, i.e. the rationally assigned strength of belief and uncertainty. If this awareness is gained the
reasoning process is ﬁnished what implies that the agent can use the additional awareness available when she/he
creates a new reasoning process.
6 Conclusion Section and Further Research
In contrast to other belief modelling frameworks, as for example Leitgeb's Stability Theory of Belief Leitgeb (2014),
we do not consider the proposition that is assigned a stable probability in diﬀerent contexts to be the rational
(strength of) belief. The nomination of resilient beliefs as rational does not make sense in the awareness paradigm,
as awareness of uncertain belief in propositions is increased with ﬂexibility and courage to introspect interrelations
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and gradual (quantitative) credences. The modelling of epistemic states allows formulating an expectation for
uncertain belief that is based on testimony in diﬀerent contexts (both minimal contexts and epistemic contexts).
But requiring the agent to ﬁrmly hold a strength of belief within the expectation to call her/him rational is not
our modelling approach. Rather, we consider the agent to hold rational beliefs and attribute the deviation of
expectation and testimony to our imperfect knowledge - and hence modelling - of the agent's epistemic state. That
stance allows us to investigate implicit beliefs to improve our modelling.
There exist approaches to model partial inconsistency and defeasible reasoning deﬁning a priori criteria for
the limit of rational reasoning. As such the agent's rationality is a function of compliance to a priori axioms.
However, a naturalistic account that aspires empirically adequacy ought in our view consider an agent as source
of legitimation for axiomatic formulations. As such consistency is a function of axioms complying to the agent's
a priori rationality. In Probabilistic Uncertainty we can measure the expected strength and uncertainty of belief
based on axioms of FHM and BD and handle the deviation of our expectation and empirical fact (i.e. the testimony)
as contextual uncertainty.
Instead of requiring the agent to conform to axioms to call the agents' beliefs rational, we solicit the agents'
evaluation whether the contexts constructed are rational, according to the agent. We do so by interrogating
acceptance as belief simpliciter and gradual strength of belief and uncertainty for the construed context, and
compare our expectation with the agent's reality. Adopting this interpretation we consider the agent's testimony
to be not only an expression of her/his beliefs but also as quality evaluation of Probabilistic Uncertainty in meeting
the aspiration of being empirically adequate.
It may have appeared in the outlines that if an agent is particularly ambitious in her/his reasoning under
the awareness paradigm, she/he might well arrive at Socrates ultimate wisdom: I know that I know nothing. The
insight that characterises Probabilistic Uncertainty could best be described by I am certain that all my knowledge
is uncertain. We draw several conclusions and sense some potential consequences assuming that the framework
indeed can foster an agent's ultimate conclusion that certainly all knowledge is uncertain as it is a function of
context.
An expected epistemological consequence is the awareness that the strongest notion of belief, i.e. belief with
probability 1, demands either for a weak (that is consequentially limited) concept or for a weak generality (that
is a limited context). The former is captured in the assignment of binary truth to possibility (accepted truth),
while the latter is captured in the assignment of gradual belief in epistemic states (uncertain belief as conditional
probability). The variability of strength of belief and uncertainty becomes under the awareness paradigm a tool
enhancing the subjective understanding of mutual impacts and relational signiﬁcance of accepted truths under
diﬀerent evaluation criteria and diﬀerent epistemic states.
An expected ethical consequence is the realization that accepting a proposition to be true is a responsible
choice. By choice of accepted truths the agent determines the limits of what is considered possible and relevant.
All reasoning contexts are derived from that choice and the agent, sooner or later, has to rise to the challenge
of accepting propositions intentionally as eﬀective way to reduce systematic biases with the ambition to avoid
(un-)intentional rational mischief.
An expected psychological consequence is the experience that the agent has a sense of certainty in a context.
One of the negative eﬀects of the worlds' limited predictability is, for some humans, a profound feeling of insecurity,
leading to a fatalist distortion of Socrates' wisdom from 'I know that I know nothing' to 'I know that I cannot
know anything'. This is a disempowering perspective paving the way for all sorts of self-destructing feelings and
conclusions. The emphasis of Probabilistic Uncertainty lies in the agent's awareness that 'I am certain that all my
knowledge is uncertain'. The respectful treatment of individual truth and the demand to testify uncertain belief
as it is in order to be rational nurtures an agent's connection to the agent's internalist truth and knowledge.
Psychologically, self-truthfulness is a form of self-esteem eventually empowering the reasoner who is daring enough
to confront (personal) truth.
An expected practical consequence of the awareness that beliefs are relative to acceptance is an understanding
that the strength and uncertainty of beliefs is always subjective for the person accepting and believing and as
such deﬁes judgemental statements about another person's beliefs. We belief this to be the feature of Probabilistic
Uncertainty enhancing sovereignty and respect in a practical, inter-subjective sense. Being aware from introspection
that one's own belief is uncertain and its strength is derived from possibilities chosen to be relevant fosters tolerance
for possibilities other agents choose and emerging uncertain beliefs in their reasoning contexts.
We consider Probabilistic Uncertainty as a modelling framework to illustrate and foster reasoning in the aware-
ness paradigm because we think it is a particular responsibility researchers have when accounts are put forward that
potentially fuel conﬂict, separation and discrimination by their modelling and deﬁnition of rationality, beliefs, and
knowledge. Rather than calling an agent's belief wrong or irrational we encourage the agent to acknowledge that
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by the agent's own light right is a relative notion and that being rational is eventually incompatible with self deceit.
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